Stateless in a Sovereign World: Examining the Kurdish Question

This article examines the structural barriers to Kurdish statehood, the role of regional powers in suppressing and exploiting Kurdish aspirations, and the paradox of international engagement where military support is provided without political recognition. The study highlights the complexities of statelessness in a state-centric world and calls for greater Kurdish unity alongside a shift in global policies toward self-determination.

A MENA Desk Commentary by Syed Aman Ullah | Edited by Aishik Goswami

Research and Publications Division

Kurds wave their flag in support of the then-upcoming referendum, September 2017. (Reuters)

The Kurdish struggle for autonomy remains one of the Middle East's most enduring and complex geopolitical issues. With a population of around 30 million scattered across Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, Kurds remain the largest stateless ethnic group in the world (McConville, 2022). Before the First World War, Kurds populated the Ottoman Empire. However, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) created the borders for the Republic of Turkey and reassigned territories delegated to the Kurdish state under the Treaty of Sèvres (McConville, 2022). From that time to the present day, the Kurdish struggle for sovereignty continues. Despite the long struggle, the vision of an independent Kurdistan remains elusive, constrained by regional power dynamics, internal division and corruption and inconsistent international engagement (McConville, 2022).

The article examines the Kurdish struggle through a tripartite framework:

1. The political and structural barriers to Kurdish statehood
2. The role of regional powers in both suppressing and exploiting Kurdish aspirations 
3. The paradox of international involvement, where Kurdish forces are instrumentalised for strategic purposes but denied political sovereignty. 

This analysis will shed light on the complexities of statelessness in a state-centric International order.

The Ottoman Empire was a member of the Central Powers in the First World War, and its territories were partitioned among Allied powers after its defeat (Kaya, 2012). The Paris Peace Agreement (1919) hosted an unofficial Kurdish delegation led by General Şerif Pasha, who had prepared a  Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People, which advocated for an independent Kurdish state (Kaya, 2012). The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920, contained Articles 62–64 that proposed a scheme for local autonomy in predominantly Kurdish areas. Modern Kurdish nationalist historiography views this treaty as a milestone, for it endorsed the possibility of an independent Kurdish state legally  (Kaya, 2012).

However, the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 distributed the Ottoman territories between the British, French, Italians and Greeks without any provisions for Kurdish statehood(Potiker, 2021). Further, only two states, Turkey and Armenia, were formed, coupled with the disintegration of the administrative order of the Ottomans and interventions by the great powers resulted in the partitioning of Kurdish-inhabited lands among Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran  (Kaya, 2012). The British and the French mandate policies prioritised their national interest and geopolitical stability over ethnic self-determination, and the internal divisions among the Kurdish leadership weakened their capacity to mobilise a unified national movement(Kasirga, 2024). Both deliberate international decisions and a lack of unified leadership have systematically undermined Kurdish aspirations for statehood. This dual constraint continues to shape the persistent challenge of Kurdish self-determination in the modern Middle East.

Political and Structural Barriers

The repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres imposed reordering of borders created a fundamental structural barrier dividing culturally cohesive people into multiple political entities  (Kaya, 2012). Over the ensuing decades, the imposed national boundaries not only physically divided the Kurdish population but also fueled internal divisions. Repressive state policies in each of these countries, such as state repression policies in Turkey, have played a pivotal role in deepening structural barriers. The Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 was met with harsh military suppression and subsequent punitive measures such as mass executions and forced relocations were designed to eliminate any prospect of Kurdish regional autonomy (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011, p. 65). Similarly, the Dersim Rebellion in 1938, which sought to resist the Turkish state’s enforced modernisation and Turkification policies, resulted in brutal military campaigns that not only decimated local populations but also eradicated nascent Kurdish political organisation (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011, p. 66 ). 

Furthermore, ongoing corruption and infighting within Kurdish leadership have weakened the movement’s overall capacity to mobilise unified action. For example, In Iraq, a longstanding rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has significantly complicated efforts toward a unified Kurdish state (Kaya, 2012). During the 2017 independence referendum, the lack of strategic unity between the KDP and the PUK resulted in mixed signs, complicating negotiations with Baghdad and frustrating potential support from external actors (Salam, 2024 and McConville, 2022). Such internal discord renders Kurdish aspirations vulnerable to manipulation by external powers that favour maintaining the status quo. The dual constraint of both the external border decisions and persistent internal fragmentation continues to stifle Kurdish efforts for statehood.

The Role of Regional Powers

The  Kurdish trajectory towards statehood has been heavily influenced by regional powers, both by exploiting and suppressing Kurdish ambitions. Turkish policy, for instance, has consistently employed a dual strategy in response to Kurdish separatism. On the one hand, Turkey uses military interventions and strict legal frameworks to stifle Kurdish political mobilisation; on the other, it occasionally exploits Kurdish groups to advance its regional interests, particularly in Syria and Iraq  (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011 and McConville, 2022). Turkish suppression is aimed at preventing any challenge to its territorial integrity, as seen in repeated crackdowns on Kurdish insurgencies. Yet, Turkey’s pragmatic engagement with Kurdish groups in specific contexts also illustrates its interest in becoming a European Union member and because of its economic interests in Iraqi Kurdistan (McConville, 2022).

Iran’s approach, while not as overtly aggressive as Turkey, its strategy toward the Kurdish people involves suppression and cautious engagement aimed at preventing separatist sentiments from destabilising its multi-ethnic society. In 1992, Iran, along with Syria and Turkey, vowed not to support an independent Kurdish state. While Iran was not explicitly against the 2017 independence referendum to maintain positive relations with the KRG, its explicit policy towards any Kurdish hope of independence remains negative (McConville, 2022). Iran has strategically implanted ideas of Shi'aism into the Kurdish and Iraqi governments, formed security and economic alliances with the KRG, and formed close ties with the PUK to increase its influence in the region  (McConville, 2022). This ambivalence reflects a broader strategy aimed at maintaining internal stability, even if it means co-opting Kurdish groups under strict control.

Iraq presents a contrasting case where the central government actively undermines Kurdish aspirations to assert its sovereignty over resource-rich territories. Baghdad’s efforts to control disputed regions such as Kirkuk have involved imposing fiscal and legal restrictions on Kurdish oil contracts, effectively diminishing the economic viability of an independent Kurdish state (Mirhanoglu, 2022). The relationship between Erbil and Baghdad is rooted in distrust due to crimes against humanity endured by the Kurds at the hands of the Iraqi Central Government, particularly during the Hussien era (McConville, 2022).

Syria, meanwhile, has provided a fluctuating environment for Kurdish political activity. The Syrian government has historically oscillated between periods of relative tolerance and outright repression, creating significant uncertainty for Kurdish groups and hindering their ability to consolidate power and secure autonomy(Villellas, 2014). The oppression against Syrian Kurds has been through the prohibition of the right to self-determination (McConville, 2022). Although Kurds were able to create Rojava as a result of the Syrian civil war(2012), Kurds in Syria continue to be severely suppressed and have been denied citizenship for years (Villellas, 2014 and Kaya, 2012). Their future status remains ambivalent despite the regime change in Syria.

International Paradox

Western Nations have lauded Kurdish militias like the YPG and SDF for their critical role in combating ISIS; however, this military backing has not been accompanied by corresponding efforts to secure formal statehood for the Kurds (Kasirga, 2024). This paradox is rooted in the realist framework. As Morgenthau argues, states primarily act in their own self-interest, which means providing political support to a stateless group like the Kurds could destabilise existing state structures(1948). Many countries are reluctant to support the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq due to concerns that Iraq would lose vital economic support from the Kurdish oil industry and face a significant threat to its territorial integrity. This could transform Iraq into a rogue state or bring it under Iran's influence, thereby destabilising the entire region (McConville, 2022). 

Kurdish communities perceived President Trump’s 2019 decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Rojava in Syria as abandonment by an ally (Kasirga, 2024). Kurdish forces were left exposed and without political backing when American support was abruptly curtailed. U.S. disengagement is seen as a pragmatic, albeit harsh, prioritisation of short-term tactical interests over the long-term political aspirations of a stateless people, highlighting the enduring paradox in international support for the Kurds. Russia's approach towards the Kurds also follows the trend of international paradox. On the one hand, Moscow had been a staunch supporter of the Assad regime in Syria, which was responsible for the persecution of Kurds.

On the contrary, it has also made significant economic investments in the oil sector of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Moreover, Russia has also recognised the legitimate aspirations of the Kurds for independent statehood within existing international legal norms. This contradiction demonstrates how Moscow navigates regional alliances and economic opportunities while maintaining its traditional emphasis on state sovereignty.

Israel has been one of the few vocal supporters of Kurdish independence. Its backing of the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum stemmed from geopolitical and economic interests (Sadoon, 2023). Economically, Kurdish crude oil could supplant all or a significant portion of Israel’s demand for oil, and the KRI could rely on a reliable Israel to sell its oil in the future (Sadoon, 2023).  A pro-Western, independent Kurdish state would serve as a buffer against common regional adversaries like Iran. While Israel supports Kurdish autonomy, it constantly undermines Palestinian autonomy and independence in its backyard. Similarly, Beijing has supported the emergence of an independent Kurdistan because of its economic investments in the Kurdish Region of Iraq and to increase its presence in the Middle East (Fulton, 2024). Still, it also remains rhetorically opposed as it does so to prevent growing separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Conclusion

The Kurdish struggle for autonomy remains ensnared by both historical structural barriers and the strategic interests of regional and international actors. While external powers have intermittently supported the Kurdish military efforts, they have consistently withheld political recognition to preserve the current global order. Further,  Internal divisions weaken the Kurdish bid for statehood, leaving them caught in a paradox of tactical support without sovereignty. The way forward requires fostering internal and transnational unity among Kurdish factions to transform military and political successes into sustained political empowerment. Moreover, urgent and sustained backing from global actors grounded in human rights and self-determination is essential to empower Kurdish groups and foster institutional cohesion.

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