Recap | Stimson Centre Panel: India’s Post-Election Foreign Policy

IFPP's founder, Ajitesh Vishwanath, writes on a Panel discussion on India's Post-Election Foreign Policy, and its key takeaways: coalitions, India's (invisible) China Policy, and priorities.

 

Event Details

Speakers:

Amb. Ajay Bisaria, Former Indian Envoy to Pakistan

Sohini Bose, Observer Research Foundation

Jabin Jacob, Shiv Nadar University

Moderated by 

Akriti Vasudeva Kalyankar, Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center

In 2014, soon after he assumed office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that his government would focus on a “Neighborhood First” policy. He sought to normalise relations with Pakistan, reach a modus vivendi with China, and invest in relationships with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal to realise the untapped potential of these ties. A decade later, a new government will come to power in a starkly different geopolitical environment. India and China have been locked in a border standoff since 2020, ties with Pakistan are on ice since the Pulwama-Balakot crisis of 2019, and economic turmoil or domestic politics have altered New Delhi’s equations with other neighbours.

In this panel discussion, three experts on Indian foreign policy assessed what the new Indian government’s regional foreign policy agenda may be. Panelists examined the potential for a thaw in India-Pakistan relations, the evolving reorientation of India’s strategic focus to China, and its goals for the South Asian region writ large as it seeks to bolster its credentials as a net security provider and economic partner of choice. They also reflected on the implications of New Delhi’s regional outreach for its ties with the United States, Russia, and other nations.

A still from the panel discussion by Stimson Centre

“It would be a mistake for the Chinese to think of India as weak because of a coalition government…
…I don’t think the BJP, with [the] experience of 10 years in government, is going to let coalition partners overrule it on foreign policy issues,” spoke Professor Jabin Jacob in Stimson’s Centre virtual panel discussion on 12th June, in response to the claim made by Chinese advisors that coalition partners will weaken the NDA’s (read India’s) ability to engage with big powers.   

But then, is anything set to change in Modi 3.O? 

Yes, predicted former Ambassador Ajay Asaria. With a reduced majority in the general elections, the Modi-led-NDA government will focus more on domestic issues, particularly economic development. However, in a legacy Modi term, it seems that there would be greater risk taken in foreign policy in general.

Coalitions, Consensus, and Priorities

When asked whether coalition partners will affect Indian foreign policy, the former ambassador asserted that coalition partners will not affect the government’s plans, pointing to previous coalitions (including the Vajpeyi era). “There is a broad consensus on foreign policy in India, and the fact of a coalition government will not detract from policies.”

But is there really a pan-India consensus? 

The Opposition, led by the Indian National Congress (INC), has criticised the Modi government for having a weak China policy and unresolved border disputes and incursions by the Chinese army. With no China policy in place, debates at Parliament would create more pressure on New Delhi to strengthen its response.

Foreign Policy is becoming less of a priority, pointed out Prof Jacob, referencing the reduction of the number of Indian Ministers of State from 3 to 2 this term, and with Deputy ministers handling other briefs other than MEA. “The MEA could use professional help..it needs to expand, and the government needs to have broad-based conversations with the political spectrum and the intellectual spectrum in India to get the best inputs on China.”

At 845 diplomats, India’s diplomatic bench strength — at one for 1.4 million residents — looks especially unflattering when compared with other emerging powers such as China or Brazil, and downright puny when compared with developed nations such as the US or France, reports the Economic Times. China, for instance, has some 6,200 diplomats while Brazil has 3,000. The US and France have about 20,000 and 6,000 diplomats, respectively.

The China Question 

With a history of turbulent relations with our largest neighbour and a series of long-standing border disputes and a humiliating defeat in the 1962 Indo-China war, tensions remain high to date. 

When asked whether we will see a ‘reset’ in India’s relations, Prof Jacob argued that the term itself should be rid from discourses in reference to Indo-China. The only reset that happened was after Galwan, after which we saw strategic and military reorientation from the Indian side. India’s multiple security upgrades, new aircraft carriers, and upgrades along the border, and the recent reallocation of troops from LOC nearer to the Chinese side reflect a shift in heightened security concerns. 

“There’s really no way of handling China without resolving our relations with Pakistan..” asserting that there needs to be a structural overhaul of India’s China policy.

At the recent swearing-in ceremony of PM Modi which saw an attempt to highlight Modi’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy with leaders of 7 neighbouring nations in attendance, there was a notable absence of representatives from both China and our western neighbour.

Pakistan and the Security Dilemma

Answering a question about the most plausible course of action towards Pakistan, Amb. Bisaria, a former Indian envoy to Pakistan, highlighted that India’s lens of viewing Pakistan is primarily through a counter-terrorism policy. Any talks of normalising relations have to be grounded in heavy dialogue, perhaps focussing on the low-hanging fruits of trade. However, terrorism can be a dealbreaker.

Are there incentives for a re-engagement with Pakistan? 

Yes, “but for India’s political class, terrorism derails the process. India requires strong assurances for curbing terrorism.”

Our Eastern Front: Bangladesh

Sohini Bose, from ORF, highlighted the specifics of Indian engagement with Bangladesh. One of which is increasing connectivity. Asserting that the Bay of Bengal will be the focus of India’s collaboration, pointing out ongoing and past initiatives on disaster management and the migrant influx.

With India recently shifting its stance on the Teesta River project, resource sharing becomes another avenue to extend warm relations with our eastern neighbour. Bose also highlighted how the current Bangladeshi PM, Sheikh Hasina, extended an offer to let India use Bangladeshi ports to develop the Northeast, with her country benefiting from better trade relations with the landlocked Bhutan and Nepal. 

Connectivity will be the hallmark of Indo-Bangla relations, Bose argued. 

On Russia and other relationships

Stressing on staying headstrong in India’s approach to Russia, both Prof Jacob and Amb. Bisaria highlighted how India retains its credibility with the Russians. While we see an inconsistent Russian engagement with India with the former’s increasing military ties to Pakistan, it is going to respond to greater Indo-US engagement that we have seen in the last decade. The Professor spoke about how the West should use India’s relations with Russia to spearhead conversations that it could not start as easily, something they cannot expect from China. “Nobody said FP would be easy. India, as an aspiring great power, should welcome these challenges.”

Whether or not India finally manages to craft a stronger and more effective policy to address China and placate Pakistan now rests with the priorities of Modi in his third term, and whether the Opposition manages to initiate those conversations.

Watch the complete video recording of the discussion at Stimson.org.