Nationalism Beyond Borders: How India’s Domestic Politics Shape Foreign Policy

Although foreign policy is rarely considered to be an electoral issue, the internal matters of a country undoubtedly shape a country’s global stance. How has the BJP's decade in power impacted India's foreign relations? How has the world reacted? And an even bigger question: does excessive nationalism result in foreign policy overreach?

Commentary by Muskaan Mir | Edited by Megha Sharma
Research & Publications Division

In the past five years, the world stage has grappled with increasingly aggressive conflicts, most notably the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-inflicted genocide in Gaza. There exist growing tensions between China and its neighbours owing to the possibility of conflict over Taiwan in the East and South China Seas. When it comes to elections, almost 50% of the world population already have or will exercise their right to vote this year, including the United States, the European Union, and of course, India.

But Narendra Modi seems to be unfazed, and even at the onset of his third term, news articles and opinion pieces imply that his foreign policy is unlikely to undergo any major shifts. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the government again last month with its coalition allies as part of the right-wing National Democratic Alliance (NDA). While national analyses predicted a resounding victory for Modi, the final outcome was a sharp contrast with his party’s seat share falling to 240. Such a turn calls for a closer look at internal affairs, as shifts in public opinion and subsequent changes to the BJP’s approach to governance may reveal any upcoming changes to India’s foreign policy.

How influential is India? Modi is one of the most politically and culturally significant leaders of today, and India has established itself as a growing power in a multipolar world. The country hosted the G20 summits last year, and Modi’s first international trip after being sworn in was to Italy for the G7 meeting. India is also predicted to grow an average of 6.7% over the fiscal period of 2024 to 2026, which would cement South Asia as the world’s fastest growing region. The BJP has repeatedly highlighted its objective of making India the world’s third-largest economy by 2027. For a decade now, the government’s Make in India initiative has aimed to boost the manufacturing sector and generate employment. 

Besides its economic endeavours, a defining characteristic and perhaps the most important one in the eyes of many is its proliferation of the Hindutva ideology, which equates Indian nationality with the Hindu religion. Holding these as synonymous threatens the secular nature of the state and excludes religious minorities such as Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists. While addressing a large crowd in Rajasthan on April 21st, Modi made Islamophobic remarks insinuating that Muslims are “infiltrators” to whom the opposition will distribute citizens’ hard-earned money to if elected. Stoking religious tensions may have been what ultimately cost Modi’s party a majority in the Parliament. 

In January, Modi inaugurated the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya where the Babri Masjid had previously stood before its violent destruction by karsevaks in the early 1990s. Although expected to bolster his approval among the Hindu majority, the move may have backfired as the BJP failed to win any seats in this very constituency. The party also lost its stronghold over Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, the latter of which is the largest state in terms of population and home to the largest share of legislators. While some experts say that India has voted against a Hindu-first nation, this outcome may also be a result of national discontentment with high unemployment and inflation rates. Additionally, the BJP’s promise— or threat— to make changes to the constitution also mobilised the Dalit community to shift away their votes, especially in the Hindu belt of north India. But what does this mean for India’s foreign policy?

India Across Borders: Foreign Insight into Domestic Politics

Although foreign policy is rarely considered to be an electoral issue, the internal matters of a country undoubtedly shape a country’s global stance. Take the case of Manipur’s ongoing ethnic strife since last May. The conflict, which has resulted in the death of over 200 individuals and the displacement of 60,000 more, was largely neglected by New Delhi. In the subsequent general elections, the two seats in Manipur were ultimately assumed by Congress candidates. Besides sparking local and national outrage, the violence in Manipur also prompted a resolution from the European Union which asked the government to take all steps necessary to protect its religious minorities. The EU debate also discussed concerns of  “politically motivated, divisive policies that promote Hindu majoritarianism in the area.” The Ministry of External Affairs responded by stating foreign interference in internal matters to be unacceptable and reflective of a colonial mindset. 

The two-part series scrutinises the actions of Narendra Modi during the riots, in which more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed. Photograph: Arun Chandrabose/AFP/Getty Images

The EU is not the only foreign body to take note of India’s actions. A BBC documentary released early last year garnered immense attention in the country and was subsequently banned for being highly critical of Modi; it controversially established the 2002 Gujarat pogrom that Modi condoned at the time as an instance of ethnic cleansing. Following backlash by Hindu nationalists, the BBC offices in New Delhi and Mumbai were raided by tax authorities, which many found hard to dismiss as coincidental. The UK foreign minister conveyed the British government’s relevant concerns to his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar in a later New Delhi meeting. Besides the UK, the American research group Freedom House has also publicly apprehended the state of Indian media; it reported prior to the elections that voting was set to take place at a time of increasing harassment of critical journalists and news outlets. Another US report found that Modi’s government was working with Nepali Hindu groups to potentially alter Nepal’s constitution and turn it into another Hindu rashtra.

Writing on such incidents for Foreign Policy last year, Kunal Purohit dubs Indian diplomats to be “tiger warriors” reminiscent of China’s wolf warrior coercive diplomacy that combats state criticism by all means. Perceived as the erosion of democracy, this has resulted in increased pushback overseas, from parliamentary resolutions to large-scale protests. When a mural map of “Akhand Bharat” was unveiled in the new parliament building in 2023, neighbours such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar expressed their indignation at being lumped within Indian territory. The materialisation of the right-wing ideological goal of an undivided India evoked statements from multiple foreign ministers, with former Nepali Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai stating that this move could further aggravate the trust deficit between the two nations. In the past decade, the ruling party has thus unquestionably shaped India’s international reputation; could this change with Modi 3.0?

Excessive Nationalism = Foreign Policy Overreach?

Modi has retained Jaishankar as his external affairs minister for a second term, the man who has played a key role in shaping the Indian foreign image in the past ten years. However, Modi-Jaishankar aspirations may not be all that different from those of the Congress. Both party manifestos of this year take a general stance on major issues. They share complementary geopolitical goals, especially placing primary focus on India’s neighbourhood. On the issue of China, while the BJP talks of developing robust infrastructure along the border, the Congress promises restoring “the status quo ante” suggesting the reclamation of some territory. The parties’ manifestos gave little attention to Pakistan, with similar reiterations of strengthening security control and ending cross-border terrorism. Neither mention Russia. Although the BJP usually adopts a stronger image, the Congress seems to have assumed a firmer stance on some issues; both parties seem to seek a shift from tiger warrior diplomacy, perhaps to court controversy. This may be especially true for the BJP following its dismaying performance in the elections.

Moving away from the milder form of dialogue, a major issue that has caused a significant stir is the registration of illegal migrants. In 2019, Modi infamously introduced the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) to fast track the integration of persecuted non-Muslim migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan into Indian society. The 2024 Congress manifesto makes no mention of either the CAA or the National Register of Citizens (NRC), but such initiatives have resulted in shock waves abroad. When Dilip Ghosh of the BJP’s West Bengal unit promised to deport a crore Muslim migrants to Bangladesh, Dhaka responded by scrapping ministerial visits to India. In 2023, Prachanda, the Nepali Prime Minister and a devout atheist and Maoist, visited the Mahakaleshwar Temple in Ujjain and performed a six-hour long ceremony, fueling rumours that he acted under the manipulation of the Indian government. The subcontinent’s internal Hindutva politics thus garners significant criticism from foreign players, especially from neighbours.

But does the decline of BJP’s popularity imply a decline of Hindutva? Perhaps not. While having lost several important constituencies, the party did form local governments in states such as Odisha where it did so for the first time, alongside sweeping all 7 of New Delhi’s seats. It may thus be inaccurate to call the election outcome a national rejection of the party. Besides, while the Ram temple caused widespread discontentment in Ayodhya itself, it was a popular move in more general terms, both in the country and abroad. Modi’s mistake was “thinking this could transform into political capital indefinitely,” according to Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 

Additionally, this phenomenon is likely to reflect in India’s foreign policy. Indians are more interested in international affairs than ever before, owing to the country’s rising global prominence. With a growing GDP and a richer population, India has certainly become more globalised but not any less nationalistic in its external outlook: in a 2021 survey, 85% of citizens agreed that Indian culture is superior to those of other countries. Modi has recently expressed sentiments on the more severe side, such as publicly condemning Canada for harbouring Sikh separatists and committing to protect India’s security. But he is likely to back away from risky endeavours abroad at this time, being cautious not to jeopardise the credibility of either his party or the Indian democracy by inviting external scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Indian perspective seems to be resolute.

Most modern societies have become nationalistic to some extent with right-wing populism on the rise, as most recently observed in the European Union elections. But allowing national pride to seep into foreign policy, a highly volatile environment, entails stakes that are simply too high. Modi’s charismatic and ambitious personality is often hailed as the core of India’s revival; any political setbacks are willfully disregarded in hopes of being reversed soon, and state-supported media companies further stifle genuine and transparent public discourse. But as voters place greater trust in regional parties, and the BJP faces a significant blowback, the party must work carefully so as to ensure that their decisions are guided by strategic interests rather than a nationalist rhetoric.

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