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In the game of mini-laterals of the Indo-Pacific, SQUAD as the new geopolitical player is already stealing the spotlight from QUAD, and the Japan-Philippines treaty is its masterstroke. What implications does it have on India’s position in the Indo-Pacific? Is QUAD losing its relevance? Does New Delhi need to improve its performance and upgrade its strategic commitments? This article traces how the Tokyo-Manila pact has brought about a shift in the regional security architecture and added complexity to India’s commitment conundrum.
Report by Megha Sharma | Edited by Ajitesh Vishwanath
Research & Publications Division
Indo-pacific: The Game of Mini-laterals
In May 2024, The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin convened with his Australian, Filipino, and Japanese counterparts to establish and debut the ‘SQUAD’ as a fresh security alliance. Thus, adding to the list of existing multilateral groupings that configure the geopolitical landscape of Indo-pacific- QUAD, AUKUS, the US-Philippines-Japan trilateral, and the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral to name the most prominent among them.
According to Jagannath Panda (an expert on Indo-pacific affairs), “As the great power tension in the Indo-pacific region is turning it into a geopolitical hotspot, multilateralism is rising among the countries here, which includes smaller quadrilaterals and trilateral groups”. East Asian and Southeast Asian nations which are feeling threatened by China's growing assertiveness in the contested waters have started perceiving these mini-lateral groupings as balancers and deterrents against China. Naturally, Beijing is unhappy with such developments in its neighborhood, and recently Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian has stressed that “the Asia-Pacific region does not need military blocs, let alone small groupings that instigate bloc confrontations or a new Cold War ''.
The recent defense signed by Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa in a Manila ceremony witnessed by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is turning out to be a stepping stone towards the formation of a robust quadrilateral security group that doesn’t shy away from making unwavering strategic commitments to allies and enunciating significant threat to the adversaries. The parts where QUAD fell short. That’s the reason why analysts are suggesting that the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines group is now at the center of Washington's foreign security strategy in the Indo-Pacific, surpassing the QUAD in importance.
Defense chiefs from the four "Squad" nations. From left, U.S. Lloyd Austin, Australia's Richard Marles, Japan's Minoru Kihara and the Philippines' Gilberto Teodoro in Hawaii on May 2.
How is the Japan-Philippines defense pact redefining the Indo-Pacific Security Complex?
On 8 July, a historic moment grabbed the attention of Asia watchers. Historic, not only because a defense treaty has been signed awaiting the wrath of the dragon but it has been signed between two World War II period antagonists when Imperial Japan occupied the Philippines and conducted unspeakable atrocities like the Bataan Death March. Forgetting last century's bad blood, the two countries have forged an alliance against the greatest contender of the 21st century- China. Beijing’s gray zone operations in the East and South China Sea have increased the Philippines' anxiety and have put Japan on alert, leading to a convergence in their strategic plan for Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The defense pact involves the Reciprocal Access Agreement , which allows Japanese forces to enter and station at the shores of the Philippine archipelago for the purpose of joint combat training, exercises, and vice versa. Tokyo had already signed such agreements which improve interoperability, with Australia and Britain, and is currently negotiating another with France.
The defense pact which was in the pipeline since last year escalated after the Second Thomas Shoal incident of June 17, when Chinese Coast Guards armed with newly released Chinese guidelines, aggressively collided with and sank two Philippine navy supply vessels. In this tense confrontation, multiple Filipino sailors were injured while Chinese personnel seized seven navy rifles. Manila lodged a vigorous protest against the actions of the Chinese coast guards and demanded $1 million in compensation for the damage, as well as the return of the rifles. Part of the Spratly Island in the South China Sea, the Second Thomas Shoal forms a strategic location as a major maritime trade route rich in natural resources. China’s exclusive claims over the reef have been contested by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan as well.
Chinese Coast Guard vessels fire water cannons towards a Philippine resupply vessel as it made its way to the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 4, 2024. File Image/Reuters
Individually, both Tokyo and Manila were in the process of military modernization and enhancing their defense capabilities. Japanese PM Fumio Kishida brought out the 2% defense budget agenda for 2027 and a program to achieve counter-strike capabilities supported by US Tomahawk missiles in its 2022 National Security Strategy. Japan is definitely moving beyond its post-war principle of just focusing on self-defense and is speedily moving towards the position of third largest military spender after the US and China. Kishida's actions dovetail with Marcos' attempts to establish security partnerships to strengthen the Filipino military's capacity to protect its territorial claims and its exclusive economic zone from Chinese expansionism. For that purpose, Japan had previously aided Manila with Official Security Assistance which involved coastal surveillance radars to build the Philippines maritime deterrence capabilities.
How does SQUAD factor in this scenario? Earlier Japan, the Philippines, and Australia individually shared a bilateral treaty alliance with the USA. Now the four-way connection will help in enhancing their level of integration beyond the hub-and-spokes model. China has decisively reacted and warned against a potential "Ukrainization" of the Philippines, suggesting that the country is becoming a pawn in the "Great Power Game" under U.S. influence.
Why is QUAD turning out to be insufficient?
The genesis of QUAD lies in the humanitarian action group formed in the backdrop of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami which was formalized by Shinzo Abe’s 2007 “Confluence of the two seas” speech in New Delhi. While it is called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, it lacked focus on specifically the ‘security agenda’ due to the hesitancy of not just India but Australia as well. In fact, the Philippines- the new partner in SQUAD, was initially trying out a conciliatory approach towards China as we in the hope of reaping economic benefits by keeping the bilateral relation amiable. Though these countries were wary of infuriating Beijing with explicit statements, the futility of such attempts was quickly realized when China didn’t budge from its claims and gray zone operations in the East and South China Sea.
In the case of India, while there is a shift away from ‘non-involvement in great power politics’ behavior and a strong move towards strategic autonomy, New Delhi still refrains from calling QUAD what it is supposed to be, a strategic grouping. The resurgence of the group as QUAD 2.0 in 2017 did bolster maritime cooperation through joint drills and Malabar naval exercises and it also gained appreciation for its vaccine diplomacy during Covid years. However, it failed to convert the aspiration of the QUAD PLUS arrangement into reality, which would have helped in deepening the integration of members in the strategic domain.
New Delhi’s qualms about hard alliance formation and repeated postponement of the 2024 QUAD summit due to scheduling reasons related to elections in the US and India, is casting a shadow on not only the QUAD’s future but also on India’s reputation in Asian security architecture.
How does India reclaim its status as an indispensable actor in Indo-Pacific?
According to Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan, “New Delhi’s tendency of evasive balancing is hardly likely to bring any benefits to India, as it fails to satisfy its own allies”. India's reluctance to address security issues in the region, in order to avoid provoking China, dilutes the QUAD’s focus. However, increasing incidents of Chinese belligerence around India’s border, most significantly the Galwan Valley incident, has led to a reassessment of New Delhi’s involvement in the Quad and other trilateral/multilateral initiatives such as the Supply-Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
With respect to bilateral relations, the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan has emerged as a key pillar in the region. India is consistently trying to improve its outreach with Southeast Asian nations through its ‘Act East Policy’ and the Philippines in particular, is increasingly seen as a critical variable in New Delhi’s ‘pointed alignment’ Indo-Pacific strategy. India provided seven indigenously manufactured helicopters to the Philippine Coast Guard last year through a soft loan agreement. The deal comes shortly after the Southeast Asian country received the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile in 2022. New Delhi's recent decision to deploy three naval ships in Singapore for operations in the South China Sea stands as a testimony that India wants to play a larger role in the Indo-Pacific region and establish its image as a net security provider.
In the 2023 Survey of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan and India are identified as the top two preferences for Indo-Pacific strategic partners by Southeast Asian countries. As Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has emphasized that India is an indispensable actor in the strategic framework for a free and open Indo-Pacific, other southeast Asian countries have started realizing the same. India with its formidable military capacity and defense budget is a valuable ally that cannot be ignored, thus the emergence of ‘SQUAD’ as an important grouping does not necessarily imply that QUAD has become redundant. But New Delhi has to make sure that the security priorities of the Quad must not be weakened due to shifting interests, delayed summits, or foreign policy dogmas.
References
https://www.orfonline.org/research/what-does-an-emerging-squad-in-the-indo-pacific-mean-for-india
https://japan-forward.com/asias-next-page-india-japan-philippines-making-of-a-maritime-trilateral
https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/the-squad-adding-an-s-for-security/
QUAD is the only large deterrent to Chinese over-reach in the Southeast Asia. Good analysis, kudos to the writer and @IFPP.
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