America’s East Asia Strategy

Today, people often speak of a ‘New Cold War’ between the US and China, with increasing focus— especially in India— on how China is increasing its power and influence. However, comparatively less attention is paid to how the US is actually countering this— what, exactly, is America’s strategy in Asia?

 

Commentary by Abhinav Santhosh Nambeesan | Edited by Muskaan Mir

Research and Publications Division

The United States is no stranger to involvement in other continents. Arguably, the very first foreign conflict it was involved in was the “Barbary Wars,” fought with Muslim pirates in North Africa in the early 1800s when Thomas Jefferson was President. In Asia, American business interests have long driven foreign policy, including the forceful opening of Japan by the Harris Treaty in the 1850s, the occupation and annexation of the Philippines in 1898, and its subjugation of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. However, Asia and Africa have both long been on the ‘backburner’ of foreign policy concerns for the US, with Latin America and Europe taking priority instead.

How has American involvement in East Asia developed throughout history?

A major turning point of American involvement in Asia was the Spanish-American War of 1898, when the US claimed the Spanish colony of the Philippines. Once resistance disintegrated, the US found itself in a position where it would need to look out for threats to its colony, which eventually came from the north—Japan. Throughout the 1930s, tensions escalated between the US and Japan, as the latter launched an invasion of China and eventually Indochina— what is now Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam— during which the US really began to develop its Pacific fleets, including their main naval base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.

Once the US entered the Second World War in December 1941, it once again put most of its focus on Europe, while it defeated the Japanese island-by-island. The war was yet another turning point, when the US directed attention to ramping up its influence in the region. The end of the war resulted in the US occupying Japan; the Japanese government that was set up in the aftermath was quite friendly with the US, giving it ample room to expand its naval power in the Pacific.

While a prospective conflict with the USSR remained on the minds of American policymakers, the 1949 victory of Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War emerged as one of the defining events of the 20th century, especially shaping American involvement in Asia for the next few decades. With the world’s most populist country now under communist rule, paranoia reached new highs in Washington, DC. One might contend that the victory of the communists in China was even more influential to the Cold War than the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.

From then till at least 1975, American policy in Asia was based on the ‘domino theory,’ where it was felt that a single communist regime would lead to the emergence of others, and so on, until the entire world fell to the ideology. President Harry Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” addressed matters beyond the Soviets, encompassing efforts to contain Chinese power and influence as well. This mindset pulled the US into the Korean War when the Soviet-backed North Korea invaded the American-backed South Korea, leading to a UN coalition invading the North. Countless thousands of American and Chinese troops fought directly with each other, representing a serious possible escalation of the Cold War. It ultimately led to Douglas MacArthur, the top commander of all UN forces there, telling President Truman to use nuclear bombs on China and North Korea, which led to Truman firing him¹.

American intentions to contain China pushed its involvement not just the Korean War but also the Vietnam War, which had significant implications for American foreign policy. Korea proved that the US could not invade any communist regime in Asia without directly fighting the Chinese. But as the Vietnamese Civil War escalated, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy progressively entangled the US into the conflict until Lyndon B. Johnson deployed American troops to aid South Vietnam in 1964. While the US could have crucially defeated North Vietnam with an invasion, it never did so because of the lessons learnt in Korea. Instead, it stuck to fighting communist militias in the South, and aided the South Vietnamese in their fight. The cataclysm in Vietnam significantly dulled American willingness to directly oppose communist regimes across the world, with presidents being wary of crossing the line and being accused of provoking “another Vietnam.”

Ironically, hostilities between the US and the PRC began to calm under Richard Nixon who was famous for his anti-communist stances. His visit to China in 1972 began the slow but steady normalisation of relations between the US and China. The previous year itself, the UN had voted to formally recognise the PRC as the legitimate China, and the US followed in 1979 under President Carter. Until then, the US and its allies considered the ROC government in Taiwan as the only legitimate Chinese government, but in the 1970s, the US began to actively engage with the PRC as the official government of China.

The American Network of Allies in East Asia

With an ascendant China posing a threat to American hegemony worldwide, successive US administrations have sought to strengthen the country’s position in the Asia-Pacific. American policy in Asia differs between two distinct regions, with India serving as a potential boundary in between. To the west of India, US efforts have largely focused on fighting Islamists— stretching from Afghanistan and Pakistan all the way to Syria and Palestine— and on containing its main enemy in the region, Iran. To the east of India, the US prioritises dealing with China and, to a lesser extent, North Korea. Despite being in the middle of these zones, India has historically not been a big part of American strategy.

In an age post-WWII, American military policy has concentrated on strengthening its ability to combat conflicts in any corner of the world. Abiding by this has meant that it has built the largest network of military bases the world has ever seen, with global army, air, and naval bases. In the event of a war with China, the US would aim to prevent the Chinese from deploying forces overseas so that the US can quickly disrupt any trade routes China might rely on. To enforce this, the US has made four key partnerships²— Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. These four nations offer the US an invaluable amount of naval power that it uses to contain China and threaten its ability to project power, and the US maintains several naval bases³ in these countries to prepare for a future conflict with China.

While Japan and South Korea are also valuable in containing the North Koreans, the US relies on their strong alignment to counter China's power, and it has been highly  successful in gaining their support. The Philippines maintains its alliance with the US due to naked self-interest; China’s infamous “nine-dash line,” now called the ten-dash line⁴, has caused hostilities with Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines who see this claim of the oceanic territory as an encroachment on their own power and sovereignty. Chinese aggression has pushed formerly neutral countries like Vietnam and Malaysia into deeper cooperation with the US, and the Philippines has grown even closer with the US against Chinese aggression.

"Bedding the Dragon", a cartoon by Kashik | Exclusively Licensed to IFPP

Taiwan is a complicated affair; despite America’s increasing hostility with China, it does not want to actively antagonise the Chinese by acknowledging Taiwan’s de facto independence as legitimate. While Taiwan informally operates as an independent country, and almost every other country either treats it as such or does not recognise it, its official stance remains that it is the legitimate government of all of China, which is just in exile. Since 1979, the US has carefully balanced its interactions with the ROC government in Taiwan while avoiding provoking the PRC too much. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 does not commit the US to defend Taiwan in the form of an alliance but still binds it to provide weapons to protect its security. Taiwan is crucial for the US in two ways: it is crucial for containing Chinese naval power, and it also contains perhaps one of the most important network factories in the entire world— TSMC’s semiconductor manufacturing facilities, known for creating the smallest and best-performing semiconductors that are used in machines all over the world. In the event of a Chinese invasion, the exports of TSMC would cease immediately, heavily affecting every sector of the global economy, which is why the US needs to defend the island and why it is assumed that the US would come to its defence in case of an invasion.

Aside from these, there exists the “Quad,” a partnership between the US, Japan, Australia, and India primarily to contain Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific. Australia has been an ally of the US for many decades, but its hostility towards China is largely a recent phenomenon. The two countries have had good economic and cultural relations⁵ for several decades, with many Chinese students immigrating to Australia. However, especially in the last decade, relations have taken a more hostile turn, with Australia now turning towards the US to oppose Chinese influence on the Australian economy.

What role does India play?

Since the 1950s, the US has largely seen Pakistan as a more favourable ally in South Asia than India, as Pakistan was eager to help the US counter communism around the world, especially in Asia. As India grew closer to the USSR, the US continued to maintain ties with Pakistan, but by the turn of the millennium, as China emerged as the next big threat to America, India was seen as a more useful resource to counter Chinese dominance— considering that the nations are two of the most powerful in Asia. While the war in Afghanistan caused the US to continue to rely on Pakistani assistance, US-India relations deepened due to a shared interest in counterterrorism, especially under George W. Bush.

India, being a major power on the border of China with a history of conflict, is now a more reliable partner than Pakistan for the US, as it has become much friendlier with the Chinese. American weapons sales to India have increased⁶ in the past few years, as US policy towards China has become more hostile under the presidencies of Donald Trump and Joe Biden, with military cooperation deepening as well.

As India works to strengthen its ties with ASEAN countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, the US wants to maintain a friendly relationship with India— though the Indian government has demonstrated time and time again that it will not kowtow to the Americans on foreign policy, as shown by India’s stance on Russia and Ukraine.

While the US and India are both members of the Quad, they are not allies. Their cooperation is driven by their mutual concern regarding China, and the US may be frustrated by India’s refusal to sanction Russia, unlike its European allies.

References

1. “The Firing of MacArthur.” trumanlibrary.gov
2. Grossman, Derek, “America’s Indo-Pacific Alliances are Astonishingly Strong.” foreignpolicy.com, 5th December 2023
3. Lema, Karen, “Philippines reveals locations of 4 new strategic sites for U.S. military pact.” Reuters, 3rd April 2024
4. Clayman, Troy, “China’s New Map: The 10-Dash Line.” Boston Political Review, 22nd December 2023
5. Marsh, Nick, “China and Australia: Frenemies who need each other.” BBC News, 3rd November 2023
6. Stone, Mike; Shakil, Ismail; “US State Dept approves nearly $4 Billion sale of 31 armed drones to india.” Reuters, 1st February 2024