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This article is an attempt to analyze the features and debates surrounding India’s nuclear doctrine so as to track and to make sense of India’s long march to becoming a nuclear weapons state.
Commentary by Varshita Rana Summer Research Intern 2024
Introduction
The nuclear policy of a state plays a crucial role in bolstering its power and prestige while also facilitating its security and integrity. In simpler terms, a nuclear doctrine states how the nuclear-armed state would utilize its nuclear weapons both during peace and war. But its goal in a nation like India is to foster peaceful applications of energy while considering national and international circumstances and attitudes regarding Indian nuclear energy's future trajectory. One of the main objectives of NAM was to oppose the nuclear arms race between the US and USSR during the Cold War, and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru even called it “satanic.” However, after more than fifty years of non-alignment, India faced a nuclear dilemma in her foreign policy.
Nehru and Dr. Bhabha were the main architects for building up a very impressive network of laboratories, power plants, and other facilities relating to nuclear science and technology in India. Bhabha opined that he was not against nuclear weapons for India’s defense, and Pt. Nehru also acknowledged the essentiality of nuclear weapons for defense, both of which were considered contradictory to India’s claims of only supporting the ‘peaceful use of nuclear energy.’ C. Rajamohan opined that India's position on acquiring nuclear weapons might be a question for the international community, but not for India, as Indian leaders weren't even sure about when the time was to acquire them, which affirms the fact that nuclear weapons were indispensable, especially after the hostile attacks from the neighbourhood, and India had to alter its course of action due to the circumstantial environment that prevailed.
Features of nuclear doctrine
Prof. Vipin Narang stated that there was no clear indication as to why the Indian elites waited so long and chose 1998 to declare itself a nuclear weapon state. He also classified phases of India's nuclear position, wherein until 1974 it was based on moral principles and primacy to national interest, followed by 1974–1998, where India did not declare its position, and 1998 and thereafter, it was based on consolidation and crisis.
The Nuclear Doctrine of India was drafted by K. Subrahmaniyan in 1998 and released in 2003. All the features were not released in the public domain in order to safeguard sovereignty. But as per Stephen P. Cohen, India's nuclear program cannot be referred to as entirely peaceful since it was non-transparent by being hidden from the press. The doctrine was based on the defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz, which adequately reflected India's Pacific culture. It propagated a “No first-use” nuclear policy, but it was clarified later that in cases of chemical or biological attack, the government has the option to use nuclear weapons. Secondly, India will maintain credible minimum deterrence, wherein it will continue to build a nuclear triad along with second-strike capabilities.
As per Rajesh M. Basrur, the doctrine was classified in tandem with India's strategic culture (defensive culture). It was also concerned with sustaining political sustainability, preserving scarce resources, and fostering economic development. Other salient features were that the program would be under the command and control of civilian authorities that would consistently work towards the goal of disarmament. Lastly, India would prohibit its usage against a non-nuclear state.
Debates surrounding nuclear doctrine
(I) Those supporting No first use of nuclear weapons
Scholars such as Manpreet Sethi say that ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons ensures that the state does not need extensive and expensive nuclear infrastructure, which in the long run prevents extensive strain on the economy, especially for countries like India, which are developing. It also prevents the hassle of keeping the finger on the trigger of our nuclear weapons, and ultimately, the state can divert its resources to foster all-round development. Overall, ‘no first use’ puts the onus of escalation on the adversary and acts as the least burdensome and inexpensive means of nuclear deterrence for the host country.
Raja Menon, in his book "A Nuclear Strategy for India," rightly states that ‘no first use’ would act as a strong means to destabilize the region. Also, we must develop nuclear capabilities to foster an environment of security rather than promote the arms race.
(II) Those supporting the first use of nuclear weapons
Strategist Bharat Karnad believes that ‘no first use’ can be possible only when a state has a high degree of belief in the survival of nuclear forces. Also, the doctrine of no first use requires efficient crisis management, which cannot be adequately initiated by the Indian bureaucracy. In a nutshell, it would be merely useful as political rhetoric. He elaborates on this by giving the example that there exists an asymmetry in terms of conventional military power between India and China. Therefore, idealist concepts such as ‘no first use’ must be revoked.
As per Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal, there is no point in accepting so much damage in the first place, especially for countries like India, where the huge population becomes vulnerable and comes under threat. Therefore, he calls ‘no first use’ a recipe for complete disaster.
(III) The issue of credible minimum deterrence
While some scholars state that India should readily accept and continue with credible minimum deterrence, others believe that, firstly, India should make it clear what constitutes credible minimum deterrence, as it would suggest India not being an active part of the arms race. Hence, it becomes a necessary requirement to declare what it categorizes as ‘minimum’ in order to prevent others from guessing and developing their own theories.
Analysis of nuclear policy
In the thought-provoking book "Sharpening the Arsenal," Gurmeet Kanwal aptly states that the debate over nuclear doctrine is inconclusive. Steps such as improvements in nuclear science and targeted delivery technology need to be inculcated. Other scholars suggest that instead of massive retaliation, India, like Pakistan, should go for flexible responses. There is also a requirement to shift from credible minimum deterrence to credible deterrence. Another important dimension in the analysis is that India's nuclear weapons are less for military purposes and more for deterrence, owing to the fact that it is surrounded by two nuclear-armed hostile neighbors in the north that could also possibly hamper India's chances of entry into the nuclear supplier group.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, it may be aptly concluded that India might be the only country that, even after having acquired nuclear weapons, explicitly states in its nuclear doctrine that it believes in nuclear disarmament, which clearly depicts that India is a responsible power. Also, India's defensive posture shows that it does not believe in rocking the nuclear boat. As a way forward, India must actively stress developing infractures, building nuclear triads, addressing the relevant loopholes, and centralizing crisis management and survivability.
References
Rajagopalan, Rajesh. India’s Nuclear Doctrine Debate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950.
Sahu, Mukti. Revisiting India's Nuclear Policy: Process, Strategy and Programme. 2020. Research Gate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343053826_Revisiting_India's_Nuclear_Policy_Process_Strategy_and_Programme.
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