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A Hezbollah supporter holds up portraits of Hizballah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Iran's relations with the outside world have a turbulent nature - beginning with the relatively high note of the ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ in 2015 to the raining down of missiles on Israel in 2024, the pendulum-swaying of Iranian Foreign Policy has the world on a teetering edge. Iran is portrayed as a “monolithic” body in itself - many mainstream analysts, especially in the Western world, tend to sideline the multi-directional tendency of the Iranian nation. Only recently, after the sudden demise of Ebrahim Raisi, were the internal power dynamics revealed to the outside world. For a country that has been ruthless and relentless with censorship and persecution, this small opening proved to be a giant revelation for external actors. Through this article, I will shed light on the conceptual undertaking of Iranian policy from a constructivist point of view.
Article by Partha Amarendra Samal
Summer Research Intern 2024
Pre-revolution Iran's political moorings
Crisply, the Atlantic Council and Cambridge University Press have traced the evolution of Iranian foreign policy vis-a-vis external developments. Iran marked a notable departure from being a traditional medieval power through the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, with many precepts from Imperial European powers such as Belgium, for instance. Being in a contentious geopolitical space had ramifications within the internal politico-religious structure. ‘Qajar Iran’ was a heterogeneous empire with a Shia Muslim majority. They were consolidating a unified Iranian identity that went hand-in-hand with asserting an independent identity from adverse British, Russian/Soviet influences. Starting from the Great Game of the 1900s to the brief occupation of Iran during World War 2, this tumultuous period could be akin to China's 'century of national humiliation' - a time when both formerly imperial powers were just granted nominal independence, on paper. The propping up of parties such as Tudeh, their subsequent banning and the off-cited response to increasing British influence – nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, were Iranian attempts to resist destructive influence in its domestic policy. As a result, Iran autocratised from within and sought help from an unlikely, formerly “isolationist intermediary” - the United States. As the pace of Western-style reforms increased, such as the ‘White Revolution of 1963’, opposition to the Pahlavi regime intensified, culminating in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and marking a beginning of austerity and isolationism.
Birth of the Islamic Republic and its immediate foreign-policy orientations
After the ‘Islamic Revolution 1979’, the Shah was deposed and sought asylum in Egypt, then ruled by Anwar Sadat – an unorthodox leader who differed quite radically in foreign policy from his predecessors. His principal challenger, Ayatollah Khomeini, had just re-emerged from his “14-year exile in Turkey”. The comeback was akin to a divine intervention; it was an echo of the belief that Iran is now on the correct (God-ordained) path. Maaike Warnaar contends that Middle Eastern geopolitics is a contentious space seen from a neorealist “balance-of-powers” perspective. This “balance” provides a deterrence that prevents a regional war from engulfing the region. However, neorealism fails to make note of the peculiar alliances and connections in the Middle East. Iranian identity has shifted notably during this period. From seeing itself pursuing a Western development model to confronting the “arrogant powers”, Iran sought a new path of revolutionary isolationism.
However, the creation of a new identity still did not stop Iran from acquiring weapons from the US during the Iran-Iraq war while maintaining a balance between realpolitik and ideological discourse. It was one of the only countries to boycott the 1980 and 1984 Olympics. The discourse penned by the Islamic Republic referred to the Soviet Union as 'Lesser Satan', while the term 'Great' was preserved for the US. The attack by Iraq was repulsed; however, due to the notion of a shared Shia identity, the Iranians erroneously attacked Iraq in return, prolonging an already bloody war. The emphasis on a shared religious identity, the creation of various volunteer brigades to assist Iranian efforts, and the cultivating of proxy jewels such as Hezbollah were the crucial cornerstones of Iranian policy during the 1980s.
Cyclic shifts between the Reformists and the Principlists Camp
The Iranian elites' interpretation of 'anarchy' has differed amongst different camps. Alexander Wendt's seminal work titled 'Anarchy is What States Make Out of It' was released in 1992, causing a ripple effect in the IR sphere. Ironically, the Gulf War saw Iran as a neutral country. It expressed support for the GCC and UN to handle the Iraqi invasion, and at the same time, it lamented the US-led effort to neutralise the Iraqi threat, of which Iran herself was a victim just three years back. With the Soviet Union gone, Iran found itself in a brave new world. During the 1990s, it created a space for identity-led dialogue and communication. A case in point is Hassan Khatami's Dialogue among Civilisations, which contradicted well-respected IR theorist Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilisations.
Similarly, Iran also supported the ‘1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam’, which was a testament to its Muslim identity. When it came to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Iran brandished herself as a leader of the Muslim world, thereby being at the pinnacle of a socially constructed hierarchy where Iran is the origin of the Islamic Revolution. This spread the socio-political changes in Muslim countries as a ripple effect.
However, there has been tension among different brands of ideologies within the Iranian political sphere. A curious case could be the differential treatment of ‘The Taliban I’ and ‘Taliban II’ governments in the Iranian discourse. From overtly supporting the Northern Alliance as a result of the 1998 killings of its diplomats to handing over the Afghan Embassy to the Taliban in 2023, the construction of the Taliban as an enemy of the Shia-dominated Iran to an ally against the US-led world order has its origins in the political discourse as well. Iranian support for Armenia against Azerbaijan is prescribed as a violation of her Shia identity; however, as Maaike Warnaar argues in his book, the dichotomy between “an oppressor” and “being oppressed” also finds accommodation in Iranian foreign policy circles and is not against the social construction of post-imperial Iranian identity.
In Western Foreign Policy circles, Iran oscillates between isolationism and engagement depending on who is in power. However, this is a simplistic take which only fits some situations. For example, near-opposition to Israeli existence is a constant, an element crucial to the Iranian notion of “others”, and its presumed role of being a guarantor of peace through offensive means are some essential notes regarding identity rigidity. In contemporary discussions, the Iranian reformist movement abets and promotes discriminating institutions that form a core part of Iranian polity today. The Iranian leadership increasingly sees itself as indispensable in societal and regional affairs instead of just being a guide to spiritual enlightenment (Marja), which can also include martyrdom – a phenomenon revered deeply in Iran and Shia theology. We could see an ensuing conflict of interest between different levers of power and their viewership towards the external world. One example to cite is the leaked voice note of Mohammad Javad Zarif, erstwhile Iranian foreign minister, lamenting the excessive interference of the Iranian military in Iranian foreign policy, thereby importing its worldview and embedding it with the discourse within the Iranian populace. The Iranian elite uses foreign policy as a valuable tool to rally around a fragmented nation of multiple ethnicities in the face of repulsions and setbacks. Iranian reformists increasingly see themselves as powerless within an opaque decision-making regime where power is concentrated in unelected people's hands.
Other players in the domestic space and corruption as a weapon
This competition among the different elites, intent on lurching political and popular focus towards them, is noticed. It is precisely why Ayatollah Khomeini created a different military set (IRGC - Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) independent of the Army's functioning – he could not have afforded to make the same mistake as the Shah of Iran did. The Army is replete with the persistent threat of revolting against the authoritarian clergy. However, the IRGC reports are directed to the highest levels of the government and ultimately hold the trust of the Supreme Leader. With the heightened perception of impending wars comes the benefit of increased funding and political support that bolsters the IRGC's standing. Alongside unelected power-holders lies a spider web of connections, within which the rest of Iran's police, judiciary and bodies of vetters deem candidates fit for a politically sensitive and popular life. Chief among these is the Guardian Council, an unelected 12-member strong body that advises the Supreme Leader on all-encompassing matters. Principlists and IRGC loyalists are entrenched in such sensitive posts, thereby leading to a hardening of the socially conservative Iranian identity and rendering meaningful change void.
In the ‘1991 Islamic Penal Code of Iran’, “sowing corruption on the face of the earth” can attract the death penalty. However, anti-corruption measures exist to the extent of punishing legal and illegal opposition. Since the economy has been inward-looking ever since the conception of the Islamic Republic, it is authoritatively controlled by charities termed as “bonyads”. These economic fronts are frequently used to siphon funds into IRGC and provide a buttress to the financial stability of the Islamic Republic and its clerical elite. These bonyads have been perpetrators of extreme corruption and have endured in the face of Iran's fiscal mismanagement despite the woes faced by the Iranian public. The bonyads are fervently accused of engaging in state capture, just like how the South African government has been the victim of policy paralysis to corporations outside of its control.
Current developments and the hardening of rhetoric
With the grave escalation currently ongoing, it is admirable how Masoud Pezeshkian is handling pressure from parties within and outside the system. The Iranian concept of martyrdom captures the public imagination. Conservative powers rooted in Iranian military circles are hell-bent on seeking revenge for Ismail Haniyeh's assassination. In agreement, the hard-right Israeli establishment seeks confrontation to satiate popularity concerns back at home. Several analysts state that the reformists are accountable to their populace for delivering the Iranian government's promises. However, they lack the steering wheel to do so. Through state control of censorship and discourse, the hardliners channel confrontational views amongst the Iranian public, as witnessed through martyrdom rallies. Protests against the regime are harshly cracked down. While the reformists understand the anger on the Iranian streets, they can merely pay lip service to it. It can be further argued that the only reason the reformists are present in the electoral space of Iran is to guide the regime in dealing with Iranians, who are fiercely “anti-establishment and pro-liberation” due to historical trajectories. However, the Islamic Republic lacks enough economic and military power to assuage popularity domestically. Hence, it is not usually able to necessitate actions after assertive posturing.
Addressing the Big Elephant and what India should do about it
The world is once again heading towards a dangerous, cold-war-like situation. With geopolitical tendencies towards other authoritarian countries like China and Russia in defiance of the Western rules-based liberal world order, Iran is seeking new opportunities to embolden its standing as a strong regional power in world politics. This has led to its rapprochement with other isolationist states such as Cuba, Venezuela and North Korea, who, in its view, share the pain inflicted upon tyrannical powers such as the USA.
However, what we, as Indians, should be mindful of is the calibration of the Iran-Pakistan-China nexus. With the signing of a 25-year extended comprehensive agreement between Iran and China and the normalisation of Iran-Saudi relations through China's brokerage, China is increasingly vying for influence in the West Asian region. Iran is closely watching the CPEC project in Pakistan, and until India is well-focused towards the Chabahar project, China's geopolitical pull will accommodate Iran into the Chinese sphere. The relative loss of US influence and its inability to contain Israeli aggressiveness, Russia's antagonism and its open embrace of the Assad government in Syria, Turkey's indifference and the reconsideration of Arab countries' foreign policies in the face of stiff public protests are some sweet spots for Chinese foreign policymakers. It remains to be seen whether the “Great Game 2.0” will occur with positive or adverse implications for India.
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