Thugocracy or Democracy: Analyzing Tunisia and Algeria’s Elections in the light of the Arab Spring

The article examines the 2024 elections in Tunisia and Algeria, highlighting the erosion of democratic principles in both countries. Under President Kais Saied, Tunisia has shifted from its Arab Spring promise to authoritarianism through constitutional manipulation. Meanwhile, Algeria’s elections reaffirm its entrenched military-backed regime, suppressing dissent while using elections to maintain the illusion of democracy.

A MENA Desk Commentary by Syed Aman Ullah | Edited by Aishik Goswami

Research and Publications Division 

The 2024 elections in Tunisia and Algeria illustrate a critical juncture in the enduring struggle between democracy and authoritarianism in North Africa. Once celebrated as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, Tunisia represented the movement’s brightest hope, with democratic reforms taking root and civil society gaining strength. Today, however, Tunisia is witnessing an authoritarian reversal under President Kais Saied, who has consolidated power through constitutional manipulation and electoral barriers. This turn marks a stark departure from the democratic aspirations that once fueled Tunisia’s political transformation.

In contrast, Algeria’s 2024 election signifies the entrenchment of an existing authoritarian framework under President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. While Algeria, too, experienced a wave of public protest through the Hirak movement, which called for political reform and accountability, the regime has maintained its grip on power through military backing and suppression of dissent. This continuity reflects the Algerian government’s enduring ability to quell democratic impulses and reinforce its control despite calls for change.

Tunisia’s authoritarian shift and Algeria’s static authoritarianism offer two paths in the North African political landscape. Yet, both underscore a common theme: Democratic structures are being used to undermine the very essence of democracy. As North Africa’s political landscape continues to evolve, the question remains: can democracy survive, or is the region destined for a future dominated by “Thugocracies,” where elections exist without valid democratic choice? And where authoritarianism masquerades as democracy.

Tunisian Political Landscape: Analyzing Democratic Regression

In Tunisia, the recent re-election of President Kais Saied has raised significant concerns about the regression of democratic principles. President Kais Saied, once an anti-establishment figure with a reformist appeal, was elected in 2019 with nearly 73% of the vote. He has leveraged his office to dismantle democratic institutions (Ayari, 2024). In 2021, he invoked Article 80 of Tunisia’s Constitution, citing security and economic crises as justification for suspending Parliament and dismissing the Prime Minister (Cherkaoui, 2024). While these actions were initially framed as temporary emergencies, they gradually dismantled the checks and balances essential to a healthy democracy. This move effectively sidelined the legislative branch, concentrating authority in the executive and marginalised opposition voices.

The 2024 election in Tunisia exemplifies the regression of democratic freedoms through procedural manipulation. Enforcing strict requirements, such as the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) imposed significant hurdles for potential challengers, including the need to secure 10,000 signatures and submit a criminal clearance form (Ayari, 2024). While these requirements were presented as measures to enhance transparency, they have primarily functioned as tools to eliminate political opposition. Only three candidates were qualified to run, with several others disqualified for failing to meet stringent criteria (Ayari, 2024). This structure limits voter choice and ensures Saied’s continued dominance using democratic mechanisms to obscure authoritarian intent. For a nation that once stood as a symbol of democratic progress, Tunisia’s declining political engagement signals a deepening sense of disenfranchisement and a shift away from the aspirations of the Jasmine Revolution.

The 2024 election saw Saied claim over 90% of the vote in a process many Tunisians viewed as predetermined (Muia, 2024). The low % voter turnout of 28.8% reflects widespread public disillusionment (Afp, 2024). This combination of low turnout and high margins of victory highlights a political climate where electoral outcomes are tightly managed rather than freely decided. The current political landscape presents a concerning paradox—one where the very institutions that should promote democracy are being used to perpetuate the status quo and cripple the aspirations of a hopeful populace. According to University of Tunis law professor Sghayer Zakraoui, the election results were comparable to Tunisia under President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled for more than 20 years. (Bouazza and Metz, 2024).

Tunisia scored 51 out of 100 on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index (Freedom House, 2024). Tunisia’s score reflects a shift towards authoritarianism under President Saied, marked by high arrest rates that have eliminated political pluralism. The repressive media environment serves as a stark reminder of the fragile state of the country’s democratic institutions. Tunisia’s media environment and civil society have also felt the impact of Saied’s authoritarian approach (Freedom House, 2024). Media restrictions have increased, limiting press freedom and stifling dissent. Civil society organisations, which once were vital in promoting democracy, now face tighter regulations that curtail their influence. These actions highlight the return of tactics used by autocrats to suppress opposition and maintain control (Amnesty International, 2024). As Tunisia’s democratic institutions weaken under Saied’s governance, the nation risks undoing much of the progress achieved since the Arab Spring.

The international community’s response to the political developments in Tunisia has been notably reserved, reflecting the challenges of balancing democratic ideals with geopolitical priorities. The United States and European Union, historically seen as proponents of democracy and governance reforms, face a complex dilemma in responding to Tunisia’s shift toward authoritarianism. The US stance largely involves expressing “concern” through diplomatic channels without concrete measures to reverse Tunisia’s autocratic trend (Arena, 2024). This reflects the tension between the US’s rhetorical commitment to democracy and the strategic need to maintain security cooperation in North Africa. Some US policymakers advocated sanctions against Tunisian officials; these calls were unmet due to fears that cutting support could destabilise the region. The EU has similarly faced challenges in its approach to Tunisia, balancing its normative role as a promoter of human rights with pragmatic concerns, particularly migration. While the EU issued statements criticising Tunisia’s authoritarian trajectory, their material support continues, notably through economic aid tied to migration control (Arena, 2024).

Algerian Political Landscape: Analyzing Authoritarian Continuity

Algeria’s 2024 election, while less dramatic in political transformation, underscores the endurance of authoritarianism within an established system. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s re-election with 84.3% of the vote highlights a political landscape in which democratic expression remains tightly controlled by the military-backed ruling elite (NEWS WIRES, 2024). The Hirak movement, which erupted in 2019, initially offered hope for democratic change, forcing the resignation of long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and igniting public demands for reform (Martinez and Boserup, 2024). However, the regime’s response has systematically stifled these aspirations, marking a retreat from the democratic potential the movement represented.

The decline of the Hirak movement illustrates the regime’s success in quelling public dissent and reshaping the narrative of governance in Algeria. Many of Hirak’s leaders have been jailed or forced into exile, and the movement’s core demands have been sidelined to maintain political stability (Martinez and Boserup, 2024). Tebboune’s administration has strategically positioned itself as a safeguard against instability, framing military-backed rule as a necessary counter to regional unrest. This narrative aligns with the government’s historical reliance on military influence to maintain control, suggesting that Algeria’s authoritarian structure remains impervious to popular demands for reform (Martinez and Boserup, 2024).

The National Independent Electoral Authority (ANIE) manages the electoral process, which has limited autonomy and is perceived as an instrument of the ruling elite. The 2024 election was mired in controversy, as both opposition candidates and President Tebboune himself expressed doubts about the accuracy of the vote count. The legitimacy of the polling process was under scrutiny (Chikhi, 2024). The government seeks to project an image of political openness. However, the reality suggests a different trajectory. The ruling elite remains essentially unchanged, and the military’s influence over civilian governance continues to loom large. While the authorities may orchestrate cosmetic political reforms, the essential control mechanisms remain firmly in place. The state security apparatus has actively suppressed dissent, deploying a strategy characterised by intimidation and state violence—hallmarks of thugocracy.

In the run-up to the elections, the Algerian government has intensified its crackdown on political dissent, employing tactics of harassment and intimidation against opposition activists (Amnesty International, 2024). On August 6, authorities arbitrarily detained Yacine Mekireche, a member of the suspended Democratic and Social Movement (MDS), due to posts he shared on Facebook. This arrest reflects a growing pattern of Algerian authorities using digital activity as grounds for silencing political figures. Later in August, police arrested approximately sixty activists as they attempted to commemorate the historic 1956 Soummam Congress of the National Liberation Front (FLN). These measures are consistent with the state’s enduring model of controlled governance, which restricts any space that might empower opposition or encourage mobilisation (Amnesty International, 2024).

Despite this repressive environment, the Algerian government portrays its military-backed rule as essential for national stability, positioning itself as a bulwark against regional unrest (Chikhi, 2024). This narrative aligns with a broader strategy of portraying limited reforms as genuine democratic measures, even as core power structures remain unchanged. The enduring influence of the military and the curtailing of political freedoms suggest that Algeria’s authoritarian framework remains firmly in place, with minimal space for democratic participation.

Algeria’s political trajectory exemplifies how authoritarian regimes can adapt to resist democratic impulses, utilising state mechanisms to manage dissent and maintain the appearance of democracy without allowing genuine participation. The enduring influence of the military and the state’s monopolisation of political expression reveals an entrenched authoritarianism resistant to transformation; in the context of North Africa, Algeria’s resilience in maintaining authoritarian governance signals that the region’s democratic potential remains stymied by regimes skilled at co-opting democratic forms to reinforce autocratic rule.

Algeria’s position as Africa’s largest natural gas exporter to Europe and one of the world’s top exporters allows it to employ "gas diplomacy" to secure political and economic interests within the Mediterranean (Boubaker and Hamzaoui, 2024). This reliance gives Algeria significant leverage with European countries, which, despite concerns over Algeria’s internal authoritarian practices, continue to prioritise energy stability over political reform. Algeria’s relationship with Italy and recent projects like the

TransMed pipeline expansion illustrate how Algeria strategically leverages its resources, ensuring European energy needs are met while discouraging interference in its domestic governance (Boubaker and Hamzaoui, 2024).

Conclusion

The 2024 elections in Tunisia and Algeria underscore the fragile state of democracy in North Africa. In Tunisia, Saied’s consolidation of power illustrates an authoritarian reversal that jeopardises the democratic ideals born from the Arab Spring. In Algeria, Tebboune’s re-election affirms the regime’s military-backed authority, diminishing the aspirations of the Hirak movement. Both cases reveal how democratic forms can be manipulated to legitimise authoritarian rule, leaving citizens with limited avenues for meaningful political participation. The international community’s cautious response has facilitated this regression, emphasising stability over democratic progress. By refraining from applying diplomatic pressure, organisations like the EU risk endorsing the authoritarian trajectories in both countries. Diplomatic pressure, conditional economic support, and active engagement with civil society could offer leverage to promote democratic resilience. However, achieving this balance requires a commitment to democratic principles that supersede geopolitical convenience. Without significant reforms, Tunisia and Algeria may oscillate between democratic aspirations and authoritarian realities. Without such actions, Tunisia and Algeria may continue along their divergent paths towards a shared end: a system where elections are held, but democracy remains an illusion. The resilience of authoritarianism in these countries offers a sobering reminder of the complexities of fostering democracy in regions where power structures are deeply entrenched. Only through internal resistance combined with international support can there be any hope for a democratic future in Tunisia and Algeria that reflects the aspirations that the Arab Spring first ignited. As the world watches, the question remains: can the democratic flame that was ignited over a decade ago endure the winds of authoritarianism, or will it be extinguished by the forces of 'thugocracy'?

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