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by This article examines Israel's offensive against Hezbollah, featuring a decapitation strategy that disrupted leadership and logistics. It delves into the tactical outcomes, humanitarian fallout, and broader geopolitical ramifications, shedding light on the conflict's implications for regional stability and global power dynamics.
A MENA Desk Commentary by Chenni Valavan | Edited by Aishik Goswami
Israel’s relentless campaigns against Lebanon seemingly spawn new challenges for itself. Hezbollah emerged as one such complex challenge, pitting Israeli Defense Forces and the nation’s intelligence agencies in a difficult counter-insurgency operation spanning decades. Israel and Hezbollah’s operations have left a stain on each other on the various facets of their existences: Hezbollah on Israel’s politico-military standing and Israel on Lebanon’s socio-political & economic landscape.
Recently, with the supply chain attack on Hezbollah by sabotaging pagers, Israel’s actions and its subsequent military campaign marks a pivotal escalation in regional tensions. It effectively torpedoed the Lebanese militant group’s operational capacity by employing a “Decapitation Strike” strategy, a pre-emptive first strike that aims to dismantle/destabilize military leadership.
The pagers, laced with an unidentified explosive, served as the distribution medium. The attack, along with air sorties and other assassination attempts, have killed many leaders of Hezbollah, such as Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas’ supreme leader), Saleh Arouri, Hassan Nasrallah, Ibrahim Akil (commander of the special ops Radwan unit), and several other top ranking & rank-and-file members of the organization.
Overall, the pager sabotage affair caused 12 deaths and 2800+ casualties, and some more when the air strikes are taken into consideration. Civilians and bystanders are also caught in the crossfire, and it seems that Israel doesn’t pay heed to such acceptable collateral casualties (Byman, 2024). It doesn’t make sense on the surface for Israel to open a new front as it is dealing with Hamas and Gaza.
So, what’s the gameplay of Israel here, how much reduction was there to the operational capacity of Hezbollah, and what are the regional and geopolitical consequences of this new chapter of the Israeli offensive?
Mirror of History: What’s Israel’s Gameplay Here?
Israel isn’t shy in conducting targeted assassinations and general military offensives against state and non-state actors which it considers as a threat to its contested geopolitical existence. These operations are sometimes tactically challenging and often make it into the limelight as sensational headlines. However, Israel seems to ignore the fact that these attacks are a reflexive response to a threat posed by itself to the existence of Palestine's statehood.
Hezbollah, a part of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’, a string of proxies against Israel, has routinely posed a threat to its security by conducting routine missile attacks and intrusions. With the commencement of Operation Al Aqsa Flood, Hezbollah joined in for its share of the war pie and started to engage in cross-border military attacks near and on the Blue Line region. This included firing missiles, rockets and cross-border incursions. Israel responded with counter-artillery barrages and the pager/walkie-talkie supply chain attack, along with a sustained air attack campaign and limited ground operations.
We must understand that Israeli activities are not new; rather, it is a strategy that has been built over years of special ops and general military operations. Although the method of distribution was not the same, the trick of lacing devices with explosives is not new, as Israel has successfully conducted an assassination of Yehiyeh Ayash (Hamas) by switching his cellular phone with an identical, explosive-laden device. However, this recent attack of mass targeting might prove to be a potential war crime since it caused civilian casualties indiscriminately - A violation of the proportionality principle of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Along with that, the limited ground offensive in Lebanon and its air campaign might be due to the lessons it learned in its experiences in the invasion of Gaza and, particularly, the 2006 Lebanon war. The Battle of Wadi Saluki of the 2006 war was considered embarrassing due to operational hesitancy and indecisive civilian leadership. Furthermore, the Saluki region was a bottleneck, which Hezbollah exploited by placing well-prepared AT teams equipped with the advanced Russian-made Kornet (9M113) missiles (Katz, 2008).
The overall war was considered to have been launched in haste due to Hezbollah’s killing and kidnapping of Israeli soldier-reservists, and the international backlash affected Israel more than it did in this current campaign. After the war, Olmert (ex-Israeli PM) and several civilian/military commanders were questioned for their lack of clarity and decisiveness, eventually leading to the Winograd Commission. The commission manifested Israel’s embarrassment, which prompted its military and intelligence offices to self-examine extensively (Mackinnon & Lu, 2024).
In the current war, drawing lessons from 2006, Israel, at a tactical level, is aiming to reduce armoured losses due to Hezbollah’s AT teams and other asymmetric capabilities (which it did by also assassinating the commander of the Radwan unit, Akil), the capture of Israeli Prisoner of Wars and Hezbollah’s underground tunnels.
Hezbollah has also been learning since 2006, too. After Resolution 1701, Hezbollah armed itself extensively instead of disarming, improving the quality and quantity of its weapon stockpiles. It had been amassing equipment through covert supply lines and experience (from its involvement in the Syrian civil war), and its geopolitical position was making the Israeli decision-makers nervous. The war with Palestine also made the risk scale of the Israeli government highly sensitive (Byman et al., 2024). And rightfully so.
Hezbollah has a wide range of missiles and rockets, from its 107mm rockets to short and medium-range ballistic missiles (Shaikh, 2021). Estimates of Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles range between 130,000 to 200,000, a huge number when compared to 15,000 at the beginning of the 2006 war. Experts speculate it might have fewer guided missiles with long-range capabilities than unguided rockets. However, that might be enough to target major economic, military and political geo-structures of Israel. Hezbollah might have been limited to purchasing larger military equipment due to concealment issues.
This is where one of Israel's many problems lies.
Israel, even with several extensive military campaigns and supply chain interdictions, cannot hope to destroy all or most of Hezbollah’s military hardware. Moreover, it cannot vanquish Hezbollah’s morale through conventional strategies either. We can draw parallels between the Hezbollah-Iran weapon supply chain and other supply chains like Ho Chi Minh’s Trail regarding insurgency resolve, spirit and ingenuity, along with keeping troops' operational capacity and morale high.
Here, Israel has successfully demonstrated its detailed knowledge of Hezbollah’s supply chains. It successfully slipped into the supply chain and sabotaged the pagers and walkie-talkies.
Hezbollah's command used low-grade communications technology, which relies on radio waves to overcome Israeli signal intelligence. Now, the simultaneous explosions, along with air strikes, achieved these goals:
- Successfully decreased Hezbollah’s trust in any acquired electronic equipment (not restricted to communications equipment, but anything that has a wire and a battery)
- Caused a leadership crisis by eliminating several high-ranking leaders of the organization, including its Supreme Head
- Crippled Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures
- Pressurized Hezbollah to launch a counter-offensive against Israel with its decreased capacity
The uncoordinated and non-devastating missile and rocket attacks on the blue zone region might elucidate this assumption. Along with that, the slow, cautioned, and limited ground movement ensures that Israel maintains a buffer zone between itself and Hezbollah’s relatively simple unguided rocket systems and border intrusions while maintaining acceptable losses. That eliminates the brunt of Hezbollah’s capabilities and forces it to use its precious short and medium-range ballistic missiles to save face, which:
- can be intercepted, as evidenced by its interception of one of Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles and over 180 ballistic missiles launched from Iran; and
- is relatively harder to transport over to Lebanese territory clandestinely.
Destruction & Loss of Hezbollah’s Operational Capacity
The decapitation strategy, along with the coordinated military offensives employed by Israel, has had a large impact on Hezbollah's operational capabilities. The loss of key leaders has created a large vacuum within the organisation's command structure, hampering its ability to coordinate effective military responses (e.g. missile barrages) and reducing morale. The fleeing of Naim Qassen (Deputy Secretary of Hezbollah) due to fear of assassination is not helpful in allaying concerns over morale decline.
Reports indicate that Israeli airstrikes have targeted not only leadership figures but also logistical support systems such as weapon depots (TOI World Desk, 2024), which are crucial for maintaining operational readiness. The operational capacity and trust of Hezbollah have been further compromised by Israel's successful supply chain infiltration, which has caused a large number of casualties, disrupted their ability to communicate effectively during operations and reduced their trust in any form of electronic/communication equipment.
Despite these setbacks, Hezbollah remains a formidable adversary with a substantial arsenal at its disposal and the ability to spring back if the aerial campaign is paused or stopped. A large portion of the estimated 130,000 to 200,000 rockets and missiles might still be hidden from Israeli radar, many of which are capable of striking Israeli territory. Iran will also replenish whatever equipment losses Hezbollah faced during this period.
This ongoing threat suggests that while Israel has made significant gains in degrading Hezbollah’s leadership and operational capabilities, the group is far from being neutralized.
Geopolitical Ramifications and Humanitarian Consequences
The geopolitical consequences of Israel's offensive are highly multifaceted and complex. The immediate impact has been a humanitarian crisis in Lebanon, with over 1+ million people displaced due to the cross-border conflict (Johnson, 2024), resulting in high civilian casualties. The destruction wrought by Israeli airstrikes has levelled entire neighbourhoods in Beirut (consistent with the Dahiya doctrine and general Israeli behaviour), raising concerns about civilian casualties and potential war crimes. The pager explosions also caused disproportionate civilian casualties, which resulted in hospitals getting flooded with victims.
In addition to the humanitarian toll, Israel's actions also have implications for regional as well as Lebanon’s stability. The escalation of violence in Lebanon, which is already fragile and never fully recovered from the 2008-09 crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and is suffering from a weak political governance system (as evidenced by the Beirut explosion). Now, the war has caused the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure and a refugee crisis, which can severely put a strain on the distribution of resources and raise tensions as the refugees migrate.
Furthermore, there are concerns over violations of IHL laws and the conduct of war. As mentioned earlier, the proportionality principle (balancing achieving military objectives with projected/actual harm to civilians) and the principle of distinction (distinguishing between civilians and military targets) were violated, as the explosions injured any person or child who was in the vicinity of the sabotaged device (Harb, 2024).
Israeli airstrikes striking civilian infrastructure is also a violation of IHL, as stated by the UNHCR chief, Filippo Grandi. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s tactic of “hiding in the crowd” by blending themselves in and storing their weapons in civilian centers can be considered a violation of the principle of distinction, as it is difficult to distinguish between civilian and military targets (which is the main aim of Hez).
The assassination of Nasrallah represents a significant blow not only to Hezbollah but also to Iran's broader strategy in the region. As a key ally of Hezbollah, Iran may feel compelled to respond militarily or through proxy forces in an effort to maintain its influence in the region or risk losing face. Iranian officials have indicated that they view Nasrallah's death as an affront that will not go unpunished (Gritten, 2024). But their retaliation as of right now is more or less tepid.
Meanwhile, the conflict proves to be a diplomatic and eco-strategic challenge for India. Lebanon signalled India to mediate peace between Israel and Palestine (that might also solve the issue between Israel and Lebanon). This conflict also proves to be a diplomatic kerfuffle, as India is friendly with numerous West Asian countries, including Lebanon, Iran and Israel. It more or less manages to avoid this kerfuffle by being neutral in conflicts like these.
However, there are direct threats to India stemming from this war. Around 600-900 Indian troops are stationed in Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and they are at risk of getting stuck in the crossfire. At least 2 Indian troops were injured due to Israeli attacks (Sharma, 2024). Along with that, it might also negatively affect India’s energy security (of energy minerals) and the 8.7 million Indians who are living and working in West Asia (along with their remittances, which make up for a significant chunk of our forex reserves – $125 billion in 2023-24 from the MENA region alone).
Conclusion
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has significant geopolitical ramifications that extend beyond the immediate region, impacting global dynamics. With the general climate of conflict being the zeitgeist of the West Asian region, the potential for further destabilization in the region raises alarms about the broader implications for international security and alliances.
However, such fears are slightly softened with a ceasefire deal on 26th November with outcomes more favourable to Israel than in 2006, with a clause for limiting Hezbollah’s military rearmament. Although Hezbollah might break off from the deal like Resolution 1701, the immediate strategic threat to Israel is diminished (Carter, 2024), as mentioned by Defense Minister Gallant, who stated that they had “crushed what was built by Hezbollah for 20 years”.
To conclude, the ramifications of Israel's offensive against Hezbollah are profound and multifaceted, with potential ripple effects that could reshape alliances and security dynamics not only in the Middle East but also in South Asia, where countries like India must carefully navigate their geopolitical strategies amidst rising tensions.
References
Byman, D. (2024, October 2). Lessons from Israel’s Last War in Lebanon. Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-israels-last-war-lebanon
Mackinnon, A., & Lu, C. (2024, October 1). Israel’s Lebanon campaign against Hezbollah draws from 2006 war. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/01/israel-invasion-lebanon-hezbollah-2006-war-lessons-learned/
Katz, B. Y. (2008, January 10). Security and Defense: The story of 'Changing Direction 11' The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/features/front-lines/security-and-defense-the-story-of-changing-direction-11
Byman, D., Jones, S. G., & Palmer, A. (2024). Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran. https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-war-between-israel-hezbollah-and-iran
What we know about Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal. (2024, July 29). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240729-what-we-know-about-hezbollah-s-weapons-arsenal
Shaikh, S. (2021, August 10). Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah | Missile threat. Missile Threat. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/
Gritten, D. (2024, September 28). Hassan Nasrallah’s blood “will not go unavenged”, Iran warns. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj31rgz511no
TOI World Desk. (2024, August 20). Israeli airstrike destroys Hezbollah weapons storage facilities: Watch video. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/israeli-airstrike-destroys-hezbollah-weapons-storage-facilities-watch-video/articleshow/112641565.cms
Johnson, D. (2024, September 30). Lebanon crisis: Over one million people flee strikes amid invasion fears. Retrieved December 6, 2024, from https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1155141
Sharma, S. (2024, October 11). Indian peacekeepers at Lebanon border to continue ops despite Israeli attacks. India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in
How money flows between MENA and India – Here’s all you need to know. (2024, August 7). Financial Express. Retrieved from https://www.financialexpress.com
Harb, A. (2024, September 19). Do Lebanon explosions violate the laws of war? Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com
Carter, B. (2024, December 2). Israel’s victory in Lebanon. Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved December 6, 2024, from https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israels-victory-lebanon
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