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Recently, many countries in the North African region have experienced democratic backsliding, of which Morocco is a clear example. After the protests in 2011, the monarchy implemented institutional reforms, leading the Moroccan polity to change without altering its defining features (Colombo, 2023). Morocco has seen variations between social moderation and repression in the previous decade, as well as political openings and counter-revolution (Colombo, 2023). From 2011, the process of democratic backsliding accelerated, the recent example of which was the 2024 amendment of Law 22.01 on criminal procedure to prevent civil society and NGOs from initiating legal action against offences involving public property, particularly cases of embezzlement by elected officials or civil servants- unless such action is requested by the public prosecutor at the court of Cassation (Al-Ashraf, 2024). This amendment is said to curtail the rights under Article 12 of the constitution and undermine the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) rights to fight against corruption (Al-Ashraf, 2024).
Civil Society Organisations and Democracy
Larry Diamond (Bunbongkarn, 2004) defines civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” Thus, civil society involves private citizens collectively working to present their demands to the state, express their interests, preferences, and ideas in the public sphere, and check the state's authority and make it accountable (Bunbongkarn, 2004). Therefore, the CSOs include (but are not limited to) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaging in civil rights activism, religious groups, and other issue-oriented groups.
These organisations contribute to democracy by holding the authorities accountable, increasing public participation in decision-making, and participating in other public activities, in turn strengthening the democratic spirit of a nation. The example of CSOs strengthening democracies is seen in many South-East Asian countries. For instance, the elites' role was pre-eminent in democratising countries like South Korea, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Thailand. Still, it would not have been achieved without the political pressure from civil society for reform, leading to liberalising political systems and eventually bringing down dictatorial regimes (Bunbongkarn, 2004). In the case of Indonesia, democratisation was made possible through socio-economic changes that included the rise of the middle class and the expansion of civil society (Bunbongkarn, 2004). Similarly, in South Korea, the role of civil society in fostering democratic transition was reflected in a series of student and worker demonstrations against authoritarian rule and demanding liberalisation and democratisation during the latter part of the 1980s (Bunbongkarn, 2004). Thus, CSOs play an important role in maintaining and strengthening the democratic nature of a country.
The 2011 Reforms in Morocco
In 2011, the Moroccan citizenry came together to call for constitutional limits to their King’s powers (Colombo, 2023). These protests that erupted in Morocco due to poverty and unemployment shook the regime but did not lead to its collapse as in other countries of the region (Colombo, 2023). Consequentially, to pacify the protestors, the regime in Morocco attempted to implement a participatory approach based on the existence of a relatively dense network of intermediary institutions, such as political parties, trade unions, media associations and human rights groups, which characterise the Moroccan system and serve as links between the centre of the political system, i.e. the monarchy and the makhzen, and society (Colombo, 2023). These intermediary institutions constitute a buffer that serves the consensual management of decisions and, in times of crisis, helps dilute tensions, absorb shocks and avoid significant disruptions of societal order.
Furthermore, according to Article 12 of the 2011 reforms to the constitution, the NGOs and other CSOs could participate in the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of state institutions (Engelcke, 2016). These reforms aimed to increase civil society’s participation in state activities and facilitated greater state control of these non-state actors (Engelcke, 2016). It was believed that eventually, the civil society actors would not question the political power configuration but would try to benefit from the political opportunities the state opens up (Engelcke, 2016). In short, through these reforms, the regime attempted to gain the trust of the masses.
Superficially, the 2011 constitutional reforms seemed to empower the citizenry by increasing their participation in the government processes and heading towards democracy. However, since the King was still central to the political and institutional life as he continued to concentrate all the powers (Colombo, 2023). As a result, civil society had limited access to parliamentary activities (Colombo, 2023). Thus, the 2011 constitutional reforms were limited in their capacity to democratise the Moroccan polity.
Reforms and Restrictions in 2024
Before the introduction of Bill 03.23, civil society organisations in Morocco played a critical role in combating corruption by initiating legal action against public officials suspected of embezzlement. These efforts led to notable successes, including the arrest of former minister Mohamed Moubdii (Al-Ashraf, 2024). However, the government has now restricted civil entities from prosecuting such cases, citing concerns about abuse of power, extortion, and political score-settling.
Civil society groups have rejected these accusations, emphasising the need for legal remedies to address misuse while maintaining their essential role in fighting corruption. Public opinion on Bill 03.23 is divided: while the amendment aims to strengthen official bodies like the judiciary and public prosecution in overseeing public funds, doubts still need to be made about their independence, especially when dealing with officials linked to the ruling authority (Al-Ashraf, 2024).
By limiting the legal authority of civil society organisations, the bill risks side-lining these groups, reducing their role to advocacy and public condemnation. This move is seen as a setback for civil society’s contribution to ensuring accountability and combating corruption in Morocco. This bill is also seen as a violation of Article 12 of the 2011 reforms, which limits civil society’s participation.
Conclusion
The trajectory of Morocco’s democratic development reveals a complex interplay of reform and restriction. The 2011 constitutional reforms, spurred by citizen protests, appeared to mark a turning point, empowering civil society and fostering a more participatory governance model. Article 12 of the constitution symbolised this shift, granting CSOs a role in state functions such as preparation, implementation, and evaluation of policies. These reforms helped stabilise Morocco amid regional upheaval by creating intermediary institutions that buffered societal tensions and maintained order. However, the reforms ultimately fell short of genuine democratisation, as the monarchy retained central authority, constraining the influence of civil society on policymaking and governance.
In recent years, Morocco’s democratic backsliding has accelerated, as exemplified by the enactment of Bill 03.23. The bill, which restricts civil society organisations from initiating legal action against corruption without approval from the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, marks a significant rollback of CSOs’ powers. The rationale provided by the government—concerns about extortion and politicisation—has been met with scepticism by CSOs, which argue that any misuse of authority could be addressed through legal channels. This amendment undermines CSOs’ ability to hold officials accountable and diminishes their role in combating corruption, a crucial pillar of democratic governance.
The restrictions imposed by Bill 03.23 contradict the spirit of the 2011 constitutional reforms, which sought to enhance civil society participation in governance. By sidelining CSOs, the Moroccan government risks eroding public trust in its commitment to transparency and accountability. The bill also raises questions about the independence of official bodies tasked with combating corruption, particularly when these institutions are closely tied to the ruling authority. The marginalisation of CSOs signals a troubling shift toward centralised control, further limiting the democratic space available for citizen engagement and activism.
Globally, civil society has played a pivotal role in democratic transitions and consolidations, as seen in countries like South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Morocco’s decision to curtail the powers of CSOs not only weakens these organisations domestically but also positions the country as a cautionary tale of democratic regression. Morocco must revisit its approach to civil society to foster meaningful democratisation, ensuring that these organisations are empowered to act as watchdogs, advocates, and participants in governance. Without such measures, the promise of the 2011 reforms will remain unfulfilled, and the nation’s democratic aspirations will continue to face significant setbacks.
References
Al-Ashraf, H. (2024). Morocco’s New Restrictions on Civil Society: A Setback for Anti-Corruption Efforts. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/10/morocco-public-law?lang=en.
Bunbongkarn, S. (2004). The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation in Asia. Growth and Governance in Asia. ed. Sato, Y. 137-144. (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies: Honolulu). https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/PDFs/Edited%20Volumes/GrowthGovernance_files/Pub_Growth%20Governance/Pub_GrowthGovernance%20book.pdf
Colombo, S. (2023). Morocco’s domestic crisis of (derailed) democratisation. The Journal of North African Studies, 28(6), 1492–1514. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207229
Engelcke, D. (2016). Morocco’s Changing Civil Society. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2016/01/moroccos-changing-civil-society?lang=en
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