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Brewing Cold War: The Middle East as a Proxy Battleground for Superpower Rivalries

Indian Foreign Policy Projectby   in Commentary , MENA , Middle East 0 comments

The article analyzes the Middle East’s role as a proxy battleground for superpower rivalries, tracing its evolution from the Cold War to contemporary conflicts. It highlights the geopolitical and ideological struggles that have shaped the region’s complex and volatile dynamics.

A MENA Desk Commentary by Sharvari Patil & Aishik Goswami | Edited by Aishik Goswami
Research and Publications Division 

The Middle East has been a theatre of war for global powers since the Second World War. This regional power struggle among the superpowers intensified during the Cold War period. The current predicament of the Middle East is an aftershock of these events. Following the Cold War period trends, it could be stated that these regional hostilities are a manifestation of the global power struggle. 


Cold War and Power Competition in the Middle East


The Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East aggravated during the Cold War, especially between the mid-1950s and the late 1970s. This rivalry was expressed on three main fronts- a geopolitical struggle to recruit allies and secure access to strategic resources (especially oil); diplomatic manoeuvres to prevent the Arab–Israeli conflict from escalating into a superpower confrontation; and ideological competition for the future of the Muslim world, where secular nationalists and Islamic radicals challenged the colonial powers and absolute monarchies throughout the region (Little, 2010). During this period, the USA backed conservative monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and even replaced the UK as the major security patron for other Persian Gulf countries. On the contrary, the Soviet Union supported the Egypt-backed countries that followed a brand of Arab socialism, like Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and North Yemen (CIA, 1989). The USSR also increased its influence in the non-Arab countries in the region, like Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey (CIA, 1989). This situation was further exacerbated by the US policy of curbing the Soviet influence in the region (Fuller, 1990). As a result, the already divided region was further fragmented due to the global power struggle, opening a theatre for proxy war in the Middle East.


The desire largely drove the geopolitical aspect of this conflict, the USA’s and the USSR’s need to secure allies and control the vast Middle Eastern oil reserves. The discovery of oil in the region earlier in the 20th century had already made it a focal point of global strategic interest (Yergin, 2008). For the United States, maintaining access to oil was essential for the economic stability of the Western bloc. At the same time, the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence in the region to challenge Western dominance and secure its own economic interests (Yergin, 2008). 


On the diplomatic front, both Cold War superpowers were heavily focused on ensuring that the Arab-Israeli conflict did not escalate into a larger confrontation between them. The region was already highly unstable due to ongoing tensions between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states, especially Egypt, Jordan, and Syria (Shlaim, 2000). Washington and Moscow managed this volatile situation to avoid a direct military clash that could lead to a global crisis. The United States emerged as Israel’s primary ally, offering significant military and economic support. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union-backed Arab nations opposed Israeli territorial expansion, particularly Egypt and Syria (Shlaim, 2000). Despite supporting opposing factions, both superpowers engaged in strategic diplomatic efforts during key conflicts, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War, to prevent their rivalry from escalating into nuclear confrontation (Hahn, 2005).


On an ideological level, both the USA and the USSR were competing for political influence over the “Muslim world”. This period marked significant upheaval in the region as secular nationalist movements and Islamic radicalisation challenged colonial legacies and existing monarchies. For instance, the Soviet Union supported secular nationalist movements, particularly those led by figures like Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, to spread socialism and anti-imperialist ideologies throughout the region (Katz, 2024). Meanwhile, the US aligned itself with more conservative forces, including monarchies and traditional elites, to counter the spread of communism and radicalism (Little, 2008). This ideological power competition between Washington and Moscow further exacerbated the situation in the Middle East by dividing the already fragmented region on ideological grounds.


As mentioned previously, the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War were pivotal events that intensified the power struggle in the Middle East, entrenching the region in broader global rivalries. These events exemplified the extent of regional conflicts serving as arenas for the geopolitical and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.


The Suez Crisis started in July 1956 when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, previously controlled by the British and the French (Little, 2008). This move was part of a broader wave of Arab nationalism that opposed Western influence and colonial legacies. This was also aimed at placing Egypt in the centre of three circles– Africa, the Arab world, and the emerging Non-Aligned Movement- rather than as a satellite of the USSR (Little, 2008). To oppose the Suez Canal's nationalisation, Britain and France, in collaboration with Israel, launched a military intervention to regain control of the canal and curtail Nasser’s growing influence (IWM). However, the USA and USSR opposed the invasion, keeping aside their differences, fearing the escalating situation would disrupt global stability (Katz, 2024). To avoid an open confrontation with the USSR and be wary of appearing as a colonial supporter, the USA pressured Britain and France to withdraw (US Department of State). This move of the United States marked a shift in the regional balance of power. For the Soviet Union, the crisis was an opportunity to gain influence among the Arab nations by condemning Western colonialism, thus bolstering its support for Nasser and Egypt, solidifying alliances with nationalist movements in Syria and Iraq, and strengthening its foothold in the Middle East (Little, 2008).


The 1967 Six-Day War further exacerbated the Cold War tensions in the region. Hostilities erupted as Israel launched pre-emptive strikes against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which were, to varying degrees, supported by the Soviet Union. Within a few days of Israel’s strike, it had captured the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights, redrawing the regional map (Britannica, 2024). The USA’s support for Israel during and after the war solidified their alliance, making Israel a critical partner in America’s regional strategy. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union increased its military and economic support for Egypt and Syria, reinforcing the bipolar divisions in the Middle East (Shlaim, 2000).


Therefore, the Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East during the Cold War was a multifaceted struggle involving geopolitical, diplomatic, and ideological competition. Events like the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War catalysed the role of the Middle East as a battleground for the Cold War. They entrenched opposing alliances, with the U.S. aligning with Israel and conservative monarchies like Saudi Arabia, while the Soviet Union supported secular nationalist regimes in Egypt and Syria. This deepened the regional power struggle, with both superpowers providing military aid, economic assistance, and political backing to their allies. These events exemplified the role of regional conflicts in global competition, leaving a legacy of entangled alliances and hostilities that continue to shape Middle Eastern geopolitics.


9/11 and its Regional After-Effects

 

Post-9/11, the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan remarkably reshaped the Middle Eastern political landscape, with broader implications for the Israel-Lebanon conflict. The USA launched a war on terrorism, which aimed to dismantle terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda. It also aimed to promote democracy and regional stability. However, the invasion of Iraq by the USA destabilised the country and created a power vacuum that fostered the environment for the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Gunaratna, 2021). With Iran’s rival, Iraq, destabilised, Iran spread its influence in the region, especially through its proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon (Byman et al., 2024). Due to Iran’s backing, Hezbollah became an important regional player, both politically and militarily, since it capitalised on the shifting dynamics and decline of traditional Arab powers (Byman et.al, 2024). Furthermore, as Hezbollah gained strength, it increasingly challenged Israel in Lebanon, culminating in the 2006 Lebanon War, which underscored the extent of its military capabilities and solidified its role as an Iranian proxy in the broader regional power struggle (Norton, 2007).


The post-9/11 American focus on combating terror also aligned with Israel’s security concerns, leading the US to reinforce its support for Israel as it confronted Hezbollah. Washington’s designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation further entrenched this stance, providing Israel with diplomatic backing in its confrontations with Hezbollah (Levitt, 2013). Moreover, the USA and Saudi Arabia recently established a Terrorist Financing Targeting Centre (TFTC) in 2017 to increase US-Gulf multilateral collaboration to counter terrorist financing (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2019). However, US efforts to limit Hezbollah’s influence through sanctions and support for the Lebanese government and Israel were insufficient to prevent the group’s growth, as it continued to receive substantial financial and military support from Iran, whose influence in the region surged in the wake of US interventions (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2019).


Concurrently, Russia, which was side-lined in the Middle East after the Cold War, reasserted its influence through the 2015 Syrian intervention. The Kremlin sought to counter American influence by supporting Assad and using Syria to strengthen its foothold in the region(Karlin, 2018). This intervention bolstered Hezbollah, which had been deeply involved in supporting Assad (Robinson and Masters, 2024). Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war, alongside Russian forces, strengthened its military capabilities and expanded its role as a key player in regional conflicts (Robinson and Masters, 2024). Thus, the Russian intervention in Syria further contributed to strengthening Hezbollah as a major political player. 


These shifting alliances and external interventions by Russia and the USA had significant consequences for the Syrian civil war and broader geopolitical ramifications in the region. Hezbollah's growing power, fuelled by Iranian and Russian support, increasingly posed a challenge to both Israel and US interests in the region (Robinson and Masters, 2024). The group's military strength and its ability to wage asymmetric warfare have made Lebanon a flashpoint in broader regional struggles, with Hezbollah acting as a key proxy for Iranian ambitions (Levitt, 2013). The US, in response, has continued to support Israel and place economic sanctions on Hezbollah to counter its influence, though these efforts have not fully neutralised the group’s regional power (Levitt, 2013).


Implications after 7th October 2023

 

In October 2023, after Hamas fired rockets in Israel and stormed Southern Israeli cities, the Israeli cabinet formally declared war on Hamas (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). During this period, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, expressed its solidarity with Hamas. As a result, this war escalated in 2024 when Israel killed Hezbollah’s longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah. After the escalation of this conflict, the USA backed Israel’s ground offensive and approved sales of $20 Billion in weapon packages (Singh and Stone, 2024). Meanwhile, Russia has only condemned the Israeli offence in Lebanon (The Hindu Bureau, 2024). However, there have been claims by the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, that Israeli forces have found “state-of-the-art” Russian weapons in searches of Hezbollah bases in south Lebanon (Agence France-Presse, 2024). There might be some germ of truth in these claims, as during the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah supported the Russian and Iranian Forces by sending some troops to assist them (Robinson & Masters, 2024). 


Hezbollah’s involvement in the civil war also opened it to further attacks by Israel, which regularly launches air strikes against Iran-allied forces in Syria (Robinson & Masters, 2024). Recently, the advance of Syrian rebels led to the end of Bashar al-Assad's 24-year rule, with opposition forces capturing the capital and forcing the president to flee on December 8(Moench,2024). Amidst the political unrest, Israel launched a series of air strikes targeting Syrian military assets and successfully seized strategic positions, including a mountaintop that offers an unobstructed view of the capital, Damascus (Knell,2024). Similarly, on December 8, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it had struck more than 75 targets, including ISIL (ISIS) leaders, operatives, and camps, to prevent the armed group from exploiting the conclusion of al-Assad's regime (Al Jazeera,2024).


The rapid downfall of al-Assad’s regime has dealt a significant blow to Russia, undermining its aspirations to extend its influence in the Middle East (Jones, 2024). The swift advance of the rebels into Damascus can be partly attributed to the Kremlin’s diminished support, as it prioritizes its efforts in the war in Ukraine (Jones, 2024). The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) warns that the potential loss of Russian bases in Syria may disrupt logistical and resupply operations, as well as rotations of the Africa Corps, thereby weakening Russia's operational capabilities and power projection in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa (Jones, 2024). For Iran, the situation is deteriorating as it is losing its privileged access to the new Damascus government, which is expected to be dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) until at least March 2025 (Wintour,2024). Additionally, Iran was not included in the group of Arab states that were briefed on developments in the capital on December 10 (Wintour,2024). In a further setback to Iran's standing as a defender of the Palestinian cause, Hamas, the leadership of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, has expressed support for the fall of Iran’s ally, Assad. Furthermore, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has alleged that the United States and Israel served as the command centre behind the orchestrated downfall of Syria’s former president, Bashar al-Assad (Wintour,2024).


Turkey continues to be a significant supporter of the HTS forces, which have taken control of Damascus and currently constitute the leading rebel faction (Graham, 2024). Ankara may leverage its influence to persuade HTS to allow Russian forces to maintain their presence for its own strategic reasons. Turkey could perceive benefits in having a continuing Russian military presence as a counterbalance to Israeli influence and the U.S. presence, particularly if President-Elect Donald Trump were to reconsider his commitment to withdrawing the limited U.S. contingent in eastern Syria (Graham, 2024). Additionally, Erdoğan might hope that collaborating with Moscow will strengthen his position against the Kurds in eastern Syria, who still receive U.S. support (Graham, 2024). (Graham, 2024)  has further articulated that, given the current climate of significant uncertainty, it would be premature to reach any sweeping conclusions regarding Russia’s presence in Syria and the wider Middle East as Putin is unlikely to abandon Russia’s military bases in Syria without resistance, as doing so would not only compromise Russia’s standing as a great power but also weaken his own political authority domestically.

 

Conclusion

 

The Middle East continues to function as a proxy battleground for the rivalries of global superpowers, a legacy rooted in the Cold War. External interventions—driven by geopolitical, ideological, and resource-based ambitions—have perpetuated cycles of civil unrest, political instability, human rights violations, and underdevelopment throughout the region. The Cold War dynamics between the United States and the Soviet Union fragmented the Middle East, creating lasting fault lines of conflict and complex alliances.


In the aftermath of 9/11, the region experienced further destabilization due to American military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the emergence of extremist groups, and Iran's increasing influence through proxies such as Hezbollah. The recent intensification of conflicts, particularly following the October 2023 Hamas-Israel war, highlights the ongoing exploitation of the region by global powers. Russia and the United States, along with regional actors, have exacerbated divisions, evident in Syria's disintegration and the rising prominence of non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas in shaping the geopolitical landscape. Consequently, the Middle East continues to suffer from political instability, economic stagnation, and pervasive human rights abuses. 


The use of the region as a proxy battleground for superpower rivalry has left its citizens contending with a lack of sustainable development and lasting peace. Unless there is a fundamental change in the way external powers engage with the region, the Middle East is likely to remain a stage for contestation rather than progress, with dire implications for its societies.

 



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