Shifting Priorities: An Analysis of Arab Foreign Policy on the Palestinian Issue

This article explores the evolution of Arab foreign policy on the Palestinian issue, analysing the shift from pan-Arab unity to pragmatic state interests. It examines key historical moments, including the decline of Nasser’s pan-Arabism, the impact of the Gulf War, and recent normalisation efforts. The study highlights how security concerns and economic priorities have reshaped Arab-Israeli relations, often sidelining Palestinian aspirations.

A MENA Desk Commentary by Syed Aman Ullah | Edited by Aishik Goswami

Research and Publications Division

Moroccan women at a protest for Palestine in 2023.

The Palestinian issue has been a central yet evolving element of Arab foreign policy since the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which laid the groundwork for establishing a Jewish state in Palestine  (Benin & Hajjar, 2014). Initially, Arab states tried to portray a united front, engaging in direct military action and refusing to recognise Israel. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt positioned itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause, using pan-Arabism as a tool to unify the region (Mellon, 2002). However, this ideological stance clashed with Saudi Arabia’s ideology of pan-Islamism, which emphasised religious solidarity and sought to counter Nasser’s dominance and regional influence (Karsh & Karsh, 1996). This divergence led to a broader geopolitical rivalry, shaping early Arab foreign policy rhetoric on Palestine.

A significant shift can be observed after the First Gulf War when Yasser Arafat’s support for Iraq led to the withdrawal of Arab financial and diplomatic backing for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), further exposing the fragmentation among the Arabs (Benin & Hajjar, 2014; Karsh & Karsh, 1996). The Gulf War demonstrated the gap between Arab nationalist ideals and political realities, signalling the region’s turn toward individual state interests over collective solidarity (Karsh & Karsh, 1996). This article examines the evolution of Arab foreign policy on the Palestinian issue by analysing the shift in Arab foreign policy post-Gulf War, the factors driving these changes, and their implications for the Palestinian cause.

Historical Background

The Arab League, established in 1945, institutionalised Pan-Arabism as a framework for collective action (Mellon, 2002). Its early resolutions reflected a firm rejection of Zionism and opposition to the establishment of Israel (Karsh & Karsh, 1996). The Arab League played a crucial role in organising military efforts in 1948 when Arab states launched a collective war against Israel (Karsh & Karsh, 1996). However, Arab unity was performative, and the defeat exposed strategic weaknesses, including poor coordination and differing national interests (Benin & Hajjar, 2014). This paradox between the ideal of Arab unity and the reality of fragmented state priorities became a recurring theme in subsequent decades.

The rise of Gamel Abdul Nasser marks a critical juncture. He positioned Egypt as the champion of pan-Arabism. He centralised the Palestinian cause, but its utility was strategic and not ideological,  leveraging the Palestinian Liberation to assert Egypt's hegemony in the region (Manduchi, 2017; Karsh & Karsh, 1996). The Arab League passed a 1964 resolution establishing the Palestinian Liberation Organization(PLO) (Benin & Hajjar, 2014). The move symbolises a shift from direct military intervention to proxy-led resistance, allowing Arab states to project solidarity while outsourcing risks.

However, Nasser's pan-Arabism faced a direct challenge from Saudi Arabia, which promoted pan-Islamism instead of Egypt's secular Arab unity. Saudi Arabia positioned itself as the leader of the Islamic world, advocating for religious solidarity over nationalist moments (Manduchi, 2017). The ideological contract played out across the region, including proxy wars such as the North Yemen Civil War (Mann, 2012).

Despite deep ideological divisions, the Arab coalition of Jordan and Syria led by Nasser’s Egypt waged a war against Israel known as the Six-Day War (Karsh & Karsh, 1996). However, Israel’s swift and decisive victory not only shattered the military aspirations of the Arab states but also laid bare the fragility of pan-Arab unity, revealing it as more rhetoric than reality (Mellon, 2002). The Arab League post-war issued a resolution of : No peace with Israel, No recognition of Israel, and No negotiations with Israel (Mann, 2012). This signalled continued Arab rejection of diplomatic engagement with Israel, though individual states began reconsidering their approaches behind the scenes.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War and oil embargo represented pan-Arabism’s last gasp. The 1973 oil embargo, in which Arab oil-exporting states, led by Saudi Arabia, imposed an embargo on the United States and other Western nations that supported Israel (Benin & Hajjar, 2014). The embargo caused a global economic crisis, demonstrating the power of economic warfare over military confrontation (Manduchi, 2017). For the first time, Arab states effectively leveraged their economic influence to pressure Israel’s allies, forcing a shift in global attitudes toward the conflict (Yergin, 2023).

However, the unity seen during the oil embargo was short-lived. By 1974, the embargo ended, and the limitations of economic coercion became clear. The Arab League soon became divided over the best path forward. The most decisive moment came in 1978 with the Camp David Accords, when Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat, signed a peace treaty with Israel. Egypt’s decision to break from the Arab consensus and prioritise its territorial recovery (regaining the Sinai Peninsula) signalled a move toward state-centric policies (Benin & Hajjar, 2014).

Moreover, the Iran-Iraq War further demonstrated the limitations of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism as unifying forces (Mellon, 2002). The conflict pitted Iraq, a Pan-Arab state, against Iran, which represented Pan-Islamism, exposing the practical divisions between both ideologies (Mellon, 2002). Instead of fostering unity, the war deepened regional rivalries and forced Arab states to prioritise national interests (Mellon, 2002). The Arab world’s inability to collectively respond to the crisis reinforced the shift from ideological solidarity to more pragmatic, state-centric foreign policies.

Shifts In Arab Foreign Policy

The First Gulf War (1990–1991) marked a defining shift in Arab foreign policy toward Palestine. Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait led to the PLO’s financial and diplomatic isolation, as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait withdrew funding (Benin & Hajjar, 2014). This moment signified a transition from ideological commitments to pragmatic state-driven policies, where Arab states prioritised their national security and economic interests over collective Arab unity. The war highlighted the fragmentation within the Arab world, as Palestine no longer held the central role it once did  (Karsh & Karsh, 1996).

The 1991 Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords (1993–1995) reinforced this shift. The PLO, recognising its diplomatic isolation, entered direct negotiations with Israel, leading to mutual recognition (Hamzawy & Brown, 2023; Benin & Hajjar, 2014). While hailed as a step toward peace, these accords also exposed the declining role of Arab states in Palestinian diplomacy. Where once Arab nations dictated the broader Palestinian strategy, now Palestinians were negotiating independently, signalling the Arab world’s retreat from direct involvement in the conflict.

In contrast to other Gulf states, Qatar positioned itself as a mediator, balancing relations with Israel while providing financial and political support to Hamas (Hamzawy & Brown, 2023). Hosting Hamas’s political leadership, Qatar played a key role in ceasefire negotiations and economic assistance to Gaza, and this strategy allowed Qatar to act as a regional stabiliser, mediating ceasefires and hostage negotiations in the conflict between Israel and Hamas (Hamzawy & Brown, 2023; Yossef, 2021). This approach reflects the new reality of Arab diplomacy—where individual states pursue independent strategies based on national interests rather than collective Arab policies. While Saudi Arabia distanced itself from Palestinian affairs, Qatar filled the diplomatic void, leveraging its role to gain political influence regionally and internationally.

The Abraham Accords (2020) formalised normalisation between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, later joined by Morocco and Sudan, further cemented this shift (Yossef, 2021). Unlike previous Arab-Israeli agreements conditioned on Palestinian statehood, these accords prioritised economic, technological, and security cooperation over ideological commitments (Yossef, 2021). Even Saudi Arabia, though not a signatory, has allowed Israeli planes to use its airspace, a move that would have been unthinkable in previous decades, signalling a pragmatic shift in its foreign policy (Reuters, 2022).

These agreements' key drivers are shared security concerns, particularly regarding Iran’s regional influence (Yossef, 2021). Many Arab states view Iran’s regional proxies, missile programs, and nuclear ambitions as a more significant threat than the Israeli occupation, leading to unprecedented Arab-Israeli security cooperation (Farrag, 2021). The Abraham Accords reflect this realignment, where security and economic pragmatism override ideological opposition to Israel.

The Arab-Iranian rivalry has further pushed Gulf states to realign their alliances. Iran’s support for armed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas has fueled instability, prompting some Arab nations to seek closer ties with Israel to counter Iranian influence(Farrag, 2021). The shift reflects the growing importance of security concerns over historical grievances, fundamentally altering Arab diplomatic priorities.

Simultaneously, economic interests have driven pragmatic diplomacy. As Gulf states focus on economic diversification, partnerships with Israel—particularly in technology, defence, and energy—have become more attractive.

Conclusion

These shifts indicate a fundamental transformation in Arab foreign policy. Once central to Arab diplomatic efforts, Palestine has become secondary to security realignments, economic modernisation, and regional stability. The First Gulf War exposed Arab fragmentation, the Oslo Accords diminished Arab influence in Palestinian diplomacy, and the Abraham Accords confirmed the shift toward national interests over collective ideology.

While public sentiment across the Arab world remains strongly pro-Palestinian, governments have primarily adopted pragmatic approaches, prioritising state security and economic partnerships. The Arab League, once a major player in coordinating policies on Palestine, has become largely ineffective, with individual states pursuing their diplomatic strategies. As a result, Palestine now faces a diplomatic landscape where traditional Arab support is no longer guaranteed, requiring new approaches to navigating regional and global politics.

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