The United States Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System During the Trump Era: Strategic Shifts and Geopolitical Implications.

This article sheds light on the hub-and spokes model historically adopted by the United States of America to engage in bilateral arrangements. Additionally, it outlines how ever since Trump’s presidency, there are increasing concerns regarding the model as well as the traditional strategic partnerships of the US. Lastly, it also highlights the role and importance of India in these changing dynamics.    

A Policy Brief by Pranali Dhavan | Crisis Watch | Edited by Harshita Prashar | R&P Division

Bilateral Relationships as part of hubs and spokes

Introduction:

Since World War II, the United States has preferred maintaining bilateral relations rather than engaging in a multilateral  relationship, like that in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in Europe. This bilateral system is known as the hub-and-spoke  model where the US is the hub and its allies are spoke. John Foster Dulles referred to the hub and  spoke system and has said that bilateral arrangements still constitute the most striking and  enduring element of the security architecture of East Asia. Victor D. Cha has argued that  bilateralism is the dominant structure because of the ‘power-play’ rationale behind U.S’s  postwar planning in the region.

In the early stages of the Cold War, the hub-and-spoke  system was considered to be essential by the United States. The United States was concerned with halting communism from spreading in Asia after World War II, especially  in the context of the Soviet Union's and China's emergence. Asia was thought to be extremely  diverse and politically shattered for a similar bilateral strategy, in contrast to Europe,  where NATO offered a framework for common security. In order to sustain its influence over  regional security without giving Asian countries sovereignty over forming coalitions,  the United States instead aimed to establish a network of bilateral security agreements.  Therefore, the then hub-and-spoke system consisted of bilateral treaties with individual allies such as  Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines , Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. 

Trump’s foreign strategy of ‘America First’:

The trilateral summit involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States took place in the early days of Donald Trump's 1st presidency, in 2017. The summit was notable  because it was the first high-level meeting among these three countries since Trump's  inauguration. There were concerns about the future of their relationships due to  Trump's "America First" foreign policy and his stern approach towards international alliances.  Moreover, Trump's rhetoric during his campaign and early presidency had cast doubt on these longstanding US alliances. He had repeatedly  questioned the value of NATO, and suggested South Korea and Japan should pay more for the US military presence on their soil, as well as reconsidering the structure of the military itself. 

From 2017 to 2021, President Trump's "America First" strategy was a  fundamental pillar of his international and domestic agenda. Trump's "America First"  trade policy aimed to reduce the United States' trade imbalance while also supporting  American manufacturing and jobs. This was accomplished through protectionism, which  included tariffs and trade renegotiations. Trump launched a trade war with China, placing taxes on hundreds of billions of dollars'  worth of Chinese goods in response to alleged unfair trade practices, intellectual  property theft, and trade imbalances. Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multinational trade agreement designed to strengthen  economic connections with Asia. He also renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), replacing it with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), claiming that it would be better for American  workers and businesses.

Trump's "America First" agenda also had an impact on US security partnerships,  particularly with NATO and its military presence in Asia and Europe. Trump frequently chastised NATO Member States, insisting that they increase defence expenditure to achieve the alliance's 2% GDP benchmark. He questioned the alliance's effectiveness and suggested  that the United States might not come to the defence of countries that did not fulfil their  financial obligations. Trump argued that U.S. military deployments around the world  were costing the United States too much, prompting plans to reduce troop numbers in  places like Germany and South Korea and focus more on domestic issues. Trump urged  these partners to enhance their financial payments for U.S. military protection,  particularly South Korea and Japan. 

Alterations to the Hub-and-Spokes System:

Recent events have complicated the trilateral relationship between the United States,  Japan, and South Korea, particularly in terms of cost-sharing for the US military presence,  trade dynamics, and defence spending. The United States maintains a major military  presence in both Japan and South Korea, with the Department of Defense committing  $20.9 billion in Japan and $13.4 billion in South Korea from 2016 to 2019. Historically, Japan and South Korea have shared the costs of hosting US forces under Special  Measures Agreements (SMAs). However, the Trump administration has signalled a desire  to expand these contributions, with the goal of establishing new benchmarks for  stationing expenses and increasing cost-sharing dividends. This move threatens to  undermine decades of carefully negotiated stationing arrangements. 

Additionally, trade interactions are now a new source of conflict. Emphasising its low tariffs  on American goods under the bilateral free trade agreement, South Korea has asked to be  exempted from the Trump administration's proposal to impose punitive tariffs on its  trading partners.  Similarly, in an effort to address possible effects on their trade relationship, Japan has initiated talks with the US about President Trump's tariffs. 

The Trump administration's policies have changed, but not dismantled, the United States' hub-and-spokes alliance system. While old alliances were tested, they also evolved to meet  new challenges, with US allies raising their defence commitments and forming alternative security relationships. India used a pragmatic approach, leveraging US engagement to  improve its own regional status while maintaining foreign policy autonomy. The long term consequences of Trump's approach continue to impact US foreign policy, as  successive administrations strive to combine bilateral commitments with growing  multilateral policies in a rapidly changing global order. 

As of February 2025, India’s relations with the United States and its East Asian allies had  shifted substantially, with expanded strategic partnerships, enhanced defence  collaborations, and a shared commitment to Indo-Pacific stability. In February 2025,  President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the ‘U.S.-India COMPACT (Catalysing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce &  Technology) for the 21st Century,’ which aims to improve collaboration in the fields of  technology, trade, and defence. One significant move is the possible sale of F-35 fighter  fighters to India, which would place it among the few countries permitted to purchase these cutting-edge aircraft. The two nations have also decided to increase defence industry cooperation by co-producing ‘Stryker’ infantry combat vehicles and ‘Javelin’ anti-tank guided missiles in India. Discussions are under progress for a Reciprocal  Defence Procurement agreement to promote more seamless defence commerce and technology transfer. Additionally, fostering industrial collaborations in autonomous  technologies in the Indo-Pacific area is the goal of the Autonomous Systems Industrial  Alliance (ASIA). 

Conclusion:

India and its allies play a crucial role in counterbalancing regional difficulties as the Indo Pacific’s strategic landscape continues to change. In order to advance a rules-based  system and guarantee maritime security, the Quad alliance—which consists of the United  States, India, Japan, and Australia—remains essential. These countries’ commitment to  work closely together to address regional security issues, especially in reaction to forceful  moves by other regional actors, has been reiterated in recent high-level discussions. 

References: 

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(http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2005/2005readings/Ikenberry2004%20AmH  egEA.pdf)  

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Acharya, Amitabh. “Why is there no NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins of Asian  Multilateralism.” [Online  

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Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East  Asia,  Yasuhiro Izumikawa (International Security)(2020)  

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